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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GINO MAESTAS, : Case No. 20000094-SC 
Priority No. 10 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1996). See Order granting interlocutory review in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Maestas 
to introduce expert testimony in support of his identification defense where identification 
is the central issue, there is little evidence linking Maestas to the robberies, and the 
proffered testimony is material and relevant? 
Standard of Review. Ordinarily, appellate courts review an order excluding expert 
testimony for an abuse of discretion. Gaw v. State Dep't. of Transportation. 798 P.2d 
1130, 1133 (Utah App. 1990). "However, the trial court does not properly exercise that 
discretion where its decision is based upon a misconception of law." Id at 1134 (citations 
omitted). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 640-41, 861-3, 864-
68. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is in Addendum C. The 
Order, which addresses both issues raised in this appeal, is in Addendum B. 
Issue 2. Whether the trial judge erred in allowing the state to use Appellant's 
incriminating statements made to a presentence investigator and the sentencing judge as 
evidence in its case-in-chief on retrial following reversal of Appellant's conviction? 
Standard of Review. This first impression issue involves a question of law which 
is reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-37 (Utah 
1994) (legal questions are reviewed for correctness). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 631-35, 853-59, 860-
62. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are in Addendum D. 
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions is in 
Addendum E. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) (1999); 
Utah R.Evid. 702; 
U.S. Const. Amend. V; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Maestas was charged with and convicted by a jury of eight counts of aggravated 
robbery based on two incidents which occurred at a Top Stop convenience store and 
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Pizza Hut Restaurant. On April 9, 1999, this Court reversed those convictions because 
Maestas was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at 
the original trial. See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 376 in Addendum E. 
On remand, Maestas faces trial on seven counts of aggravated robbery after the 
trial judge consolidated two of the counts. R. 830-31. The trial judge suppressed 
testimony identifying Maestas as the robber by three of the seven witnesses, but allowed 
the three witnesses to testify as to the details of what they had observed. R. 710, 711, 
712. On January 5, 2000, the trial judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law for 
each of the issues outlined above as well as a single order disposing of the two issues. 
The proceedings have been stayed pending the outcome of this interlocutory appeal. 
Gino is incarcerated at the Salt Lake County jail pending trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 20, 1995, Maestas was arrested shortly after two robberies occurred 
in downtown Salt Lake City. Officers were looking for a male Hispanic in a blue, late 
70fs Camaro. R. 363. An officer spotted a car that fit that description near the Pizza Hut 
which had been robbed. R. 363, 364. The hood was warm, and crumpled dollar bills and 
a jacket similar to that of the robber were inside the car. R. 364, 365. 
Maestas and Mary Sisneros came out of an apartment. R. 367. One of them took 
something from the car to the apartment. R. 367. The pair drove out of the parking lot 
and were stopped by several officers. R. 367. The officers conducted a showup where a 
3 
handcuffed Maestas was surrounded by officers and police cars with activated lights and 
a spotlight trained on Maestas. R. 367, 369, 375. Most of the victims of the two 
robberies viewed Maestas under these suggestive circumstances. R. 369. 
Officers searched the car and the Sisneros apartment and found the crumpled 
dollar bills, a jacket, a hat, and a neck gator. R. 396, 398. They found only $53 even 
though more than $200 was taken in the two robberies. R. 310, 400. The officers did not 
find the change or day planner pouch which were taken, a gun, or the bag the robber 
used. R. 372,400, 401,403. Moreover, the clothing Maestas wore when he was arrested 
did not match the description, and some of the witnesses did not believe the jacket and or 
hat were the ones worn by the robber. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, ^[36. 
Maestas testified at the original trial that he had been at Mary Sisneros' apartment 
when the robberies occurred. R. 413. He arrived at about 5:00 p.m. or 5:30 p.m. and left 
a few minutes before 9:00 p.m. to go to the store. R. 413. He gave Mary $10 he owed 
her, ate, helped clean up, and talked with Mary's nephew. R. 425, 429, 414. At times, 
Mary was in the back of the apartment. R. 425. According to one of the officers, Mary 
said Maestas could have left and she would not have known he was gone. R. 452-53. 
Mary verified that she had a party that night and Maestas was there. R. 438,44,445-46. 
In addition to viewing Maestas at the showup, the witnesses have viewed him a 
number of times, including, at a minimum, at the lineup, the preliminary hearing, the 
original trial, and the suppression hearing. R. 882:134. Moreover, the witnesses sat 
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together outside the suppression hearing and discussed their memories, including the way 
the robber acted, his mannerisms and his physical characteristics. R. 882:50. 
1. The Convenience Store Robbery 
One count of aggravated robbery is based on a robbery which occurred at a 
convenience store at 488 East 100 South in Salt Lake City at about 8:00 p.m. R. 268. 
Paul Harbrecht, the only witness to that robbery, was at the counter reading a newspaper 
when a man in a baseball cap with a mask across the lower part of his nose and face 
entered, pulled out a "long barreled black gun like a pistol," and said, "I want your 
money." R. 268. The robber wore a two-tone jacket, but Harbrecht did not think the 
seized jacket was the jacket worn by the robber; he also did not think the cap seized from 
the Sisneros residence was the robber's hat. R. 268, 269, 272, 276-77. Harbrecht 
described the robber's speech as normal and his eyes as brown. R. 275-77. Maestas' 
eyes are green, and the Pizza Hut robber's speech was unusual. R. 415, 304, 320. 
When the robber entered the store, he put a white backpack on the counter and 
asked for money. R. 269. That backpack was not found after Maestas was arrested. 
Maestas. 1999 UT 32, f36; R. 403. Harbrecht was preoccupied following the robber's 
instructions to open the till and put money in the backpack, and opening his own wallet 
while trying to retain his identification. R. 269-70, 274. After the robber left, Harbrecht 
ran outside and saw a mid-1980 Camaro in the distance. R. 272, 288. Maestas' Camaro 
was a 1970fs model and blue in color, with the distinctive appearance of a low rider with 
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chrome wheels. R. 363-64, 415. Harbrecht, who had been the victim of three other 
robberies, gave a general description of the robber as a male Hispanic in his twenties, five 
feet seven to five feet nine inches tall, with dark short hair and dark eyes, wearing a white 
hat, blue Levis and a two-tone coat. R. 279, 882:53. Maestas was not wearing that 
clothing when he was arrested a short time later. R. 374, 388-89, 492, 882:62. 
While Harbrecht was filling out the police report, he heard another robbery which 
was "basically . . . the same description" being reported over the police radio. R. 273, 
280-81. The officer told Harbrecht that she might return to take him "to identify the 
person." R. 273. She later returned and told Harbrecht "that they had caught the suspect 
and she wanted [Harbrecht] to identify him." R. 273. She drove Harbrecht to where the 
suspect, Appellant, was being held. Maestas was in handcuffs, surrounded by police 
officers with a spotlight and headlights directed at him. R. 284, 375, 388. 
Harbrecht identified Maestas at the suppression hearing as the robber, and 
indicated he was certain because he looked the same as the robber and Harbrecht 
remembered him from the previous trial. R. 882:61. The trial judge denied Appellant's 
motion to suppress Harbrecht's identification testimony at the second trial. 
2. The Pizza Hut Robberies 
The second robbery, which spawned six of the aggravated robbery charges, 
occurred at Pizza Hut located at 787 North Redwood Road at a little before 9:00 p.m. on 
the same night. R. 292. A man dressed in Levis, a jacket and hat, with a face mask 
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covering his head and the lower part of his nose and face, entered a restaurant and pulled 
a gun. R. 292-93, 305. Six people were in the restaurant at the time. 
(a) Kurt Anderson. Anderson noticed the robber as Anderson walked towards the 
cash register. R. 294-5, 304. The robber stuck a black gun in Anderson's face and told 
him to put the cash register money in the bag. R. 295. Anderson's "life flashed before 
[his] eyes". R. 295. After Anderson told the manager, Jesse Baldwin, what was going 
on, Anderson got on the ground as the robber had requested. R. 296. While on the floor, 
Anderson was unable to see the robber. R. 296. Everything happened very quickly and 
he was actually dealing with the robber for only about a minute. R. 882:136. 
Anderson viewed the robber for a total of about two minutes, at an angle from the 
side. R. 304. He was shaken up throughout the robbery. R. 882:126. He testified that 
the robber wore a bandanna and a hat. R. 822:137. He tried to remember the robber's 
features, but testified at the suppression hearing, "[t]here was some things I did try to 
picture. But I couldn't, so I just guessed on it." R. 882:138. 
Shortly after the robbery, an officer told Anderson they had a suspect in custody 
and that they wanted him to "come down and give an on-sight identification." 
R. 882:128. Anderson and Baldwin rode together in a police car to view the suspect. 
R. 299, 301, 380, 882:128. A male suspect in handcuffs stood amid several officers and 
police cars with emergency lights activated and lights trained on the suspect. R. 299-300, 
379. It was obvious to Anderson who he was being asked to identify. R. 882:142. 
7 
Anderson initially had a question as to whether Maestas was the robber. R. 300. 
When he got closer than twelve feet, he became more sure and eventually told officers 
that he was fairly convinced that the suspect was the robber, and that after viewing the 
jacket, that certainty increased. R. 882:131. 
Anderson's showup identification was made after he and Baldwin discussed the 
similarities and differences between the robber and Maestas. R. 381-82. Baldwin spoke 
first, saying he remembered the eyes. R. 381. Baldwin also said he recognized the shoes; 
Anderson then agreed the shoes were similar. R. 882:143-44; 382. Baldwin told the 
officer he was positive. R. 882:144. After having this discussion and moving closer, 
Kurt "started getting a positive ID." R. 300-01. 
Anderson filled out a witness report before going to the showup. R. 882:146. In 
that witness report, he indicated that he was unable to identify the suspect because he did 
not think he would be able to identify the robber. R. 882:146-47. At the suppression 
hearing, Anderson acknowledged that the only reason he recognized Maestas as the 
robber at the lineup "was because he had seen him at the show-up." R. 882:154. He later 
testified over objection, however, that he thought he would have been able to identify the 
robber even if he had not been subjected to the showup. R. 882:155. The trial judge 
denied Appellant's motion to suppress Anderson's identification testimony. 
(b) Jesse Baldwin. Baldwin realized they were being robbed when Anderson and 
the robber approached him. R. 307. The robber was holding a gun and handed a bag to 
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Baldwin. R. 308. Baldwin was terrified and tried not to pay attention to the gun. R. 309; 
882:139. Baldwin gave the robber $160 to $170 from the till. R. 310. The money was in 
small bills of $20 or less and included $15 in change. R. 303. No change was found and 
only $53 were recovered from the vehicle or Sisneros' apartment. R. 400. Baldwin saw 
the robber for a total of 4 to 5 minutes, but during some of that time, the robber was 
around the corner or out of sight or Baldwin was focusing on the till or safe. R. 311, 312. 
According to Baldwin, the robber weighed 180 pounds, had small brown eyes, thick 
eyebrows, a deep voice with a slight accent, wrinkles in his forehead and around his eyes, 
and an odd gait. R. 319-21. When Baldwin was at the showup with Anderson, he 
initially had a slight question as to whether Maestas was the robber, but became more 
certain after he saw the coat. R. 317. The trial judge denied Appellant's motion to 
suppress Baldwin's identification of Maestas as the robber. R. 713. 
(c) Shelby Kurys. Shelby was cleaning when he turned around and saw Baldwin 
walking with someone who was holding a gun to Baldwin's back. R. 353. They were 
about 15-20 feet away. R. 882:8. The lighting was very poor. R. 882:14. Shelby had 
only a four foot area to view Baldwin and the robber. When they moved beyond that 
area, he could not see them. He had them under observation for about 30-45 seconds. 
R. 882:9. The robber walked out of view towards the safe, then returned and told Shelby 
to get on the floor. R. 354; 882:10. Once Shelby was on the floor, he could not see 
much. R. 357. He and his wife, Leslie, were paying attention to each other and did not 
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pay much attention to the robber. R.882:11. He could not see the robber's shirt and 
could not remember the color of the robber's pants. R. 360. The robber's mask was 
black and covered the bridge of the robber's nose as well as his neck. R. 360. Shelby 
described the robber's eyebrows as thick and his eyes as brown or hazel. R. 360. 
Shelby was not taken to the showup. R. 882:17. Shelby picked someone other 
than Maestas at the lineup. State's Exh. 3. Nevertheless, the trial court denied Maestas' 
motion to suppress Shelby's testimony identifying Maestas as the robber. R. 709. 
(d) Leslie Kurvs, Kara Hsaio, Candace Hsaio. Each of these witnesses gave 
testimony identifying Maestas as the robber at the first trial. The current trial judge has 
acknowledged that the identification testimony of these witnesses is constitutionally 
unreliable and has granted Maestas' motion to suppress that testimony. R. 710-11. He 
nevertheless has permitted these witnesses to testify regarding specific features, 
descriptions of the robber or his clothing, and other facts that they recall. R. 710. 
(1) Leslie Kurvs. Leslie was traumatized and her exposure to the robber was 
extremely brief since she first became aware of the robber when he turned her around and 
placed her on the floor. R. 710, 346, 348, 355. Because she was on the floor and was not 
looking at the robber for most of the time he was present, Leslie was not able to identify 
him. R. 710. Leslie did not look at the robber's eyes or face and picked someone else out 
of the lineup. R. 710, 358; State's Exhibit 3. 
(2) Kara Hsaio. Kara could not see the robber well and looked at the gun or the 
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table rather than the robber. R. 882:85-87; 711. The lighting was dark and very poor. 
R. 882:85. All she could remember seeing was a gun and a dirty white bag that the 
robber was holding. R. 882:86. She was terrified and did not really look at the robber. 
R. 882:87, 89. She gave the robber four or five crumpled dollar bills. R. 882:86. Kara 
was taken with her mother to the showup after being told the officers had caught someone 
and they wanted her to identify him. R. 882:87, 92. It was evident to Kara at the showup 
who she was supposed to identify, but she could not recall whether she had actually made 
an identification that night. R. 882:93, 88. At the lineup, Kara selected three possible 
suspects. R. 334, 343, 882:89. At the motion to suppress hearing, she testified that she 
could not make an in-court identification. R. 882:89. She also testified that she pretty 
much did not remember anything although she had attempted to refresh her memory by 
reviewing her prior testimony and witness report. R. 882:96. 
(3) Candace Hsaio. Candace, Kara's mother, was distracted by fears for her 
daughter and tried not to focus on the robber during the two to three minutes he was at 
their table. R. 712. She was very frightened and traumatized. R. 882:106-07. She 
remembered looking at the gun, which was pointed at her daughter. R. 882:100. The 
robber's face was covered except for the eyes. R. 882:107. Candace had noticed the 
robber's jacket earlier, before the robber approached her table. R. 882:107-08. She had 
focused on that jacket and noticed the shimmering effect it had. R. 882:108. She testified 
at the original trial that the jacket taken from Maestas's car was not the robber's jacket 
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and the hat was not the robber's hat. R. 329; 882:111. Candace gave the robber the 
pouch from her day planner which contained money. R. 882:100. That pouch was not 
found by police when Maestas was arrested shortly after the robberies. R. 401. 
Candace rode to the showup with Kara in a police car. R. 882:103. Candace was 
not sure at the showup that Maestas was the robber. R. 882:103. Candace also viewed 
Maestas at the lineup but could not identify him as the robber. R. 882:104-05; 334, 343. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Expert testimony. The trial court erred in denying Maestas the opportunity to 
introduce expert testimony in support of his identification defense. The trial judge's 
ruling is based on the third factor in State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 398-400 (Utah 
1989)—whether the expert testimony would assist the trier of fact. The trial judge abused 
his discretion in precluding the use of expert testimony in this case where identification is 
the central issue, there is little other evidence linking Maestas to the robberies, and the 
proffered expert testimony is material and relevant. As this Court recognized in State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-89 (Utah 1986), jurors often have misconceptions as to the 
reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. The proffered expert testimony would 
assist the jury in reaching a fair and informed decision and should be admitted. 
Admission of Statements Which Were Made as Part of Sentencing. Admission of 
Maestas' statements in the Statement of the Offense form which is included in the 
presentence investigation report violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (1999) and the 
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Code of Judicial Administration which limit the use of presentence investigation reports 
and preclude the use of this report at Maestas' trial. Since Maestas' Statement of the 
Offense form is part of the contents of the presentence investigation report, the trial judge 
erred in allowing the state to introduce these statements at trial 
Admission of Maestas' statements to the presentence investigator and at 
sentencing also violates Maestas' right against self-incrimination and his right to appear 
and defend appeal. Maestas did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the protection 
against self-incrimination when he made allocution statements at sentencing. Because 
Utah sentencing judges can consider whether a defendant takes responsibility for his 
crimes in assessing the harshness of a sentence, the statements were not voluntary. A 
knowing waiver did not occur since, among other things, Maestas was not informed of his 
right to appeal the original conviction and did not know that if the conviction was 
overturned, his allocution statements would be used against him at a future trial. The 
privilege was also not waived since the conviction was later overturned. Policy reasons 
also demonstrate that the privilege should not be considered waived as to future trials 
when a defendant speaks out at sentencing. If the privilege is considered waived under 
these circumstances, defendants who are appealing will not speak out at sentencing and 
trial judges will not be provided full and complete information when making sentencing 
decisions. In addition, the allocution statements were not a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination since they were "the fruit of the 
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poisonous tree" as a result of the ineffective assistance Maestas received at trial. 
If exercising the right to allocution at sentencing were considered a waiver of the 
privilege against self-incrimination at any future trial, defendants would be forced to 
choose between allocution and the right to a fair sentencing, and the right to appeal and a 
fair trial if the original conviction is overturned. If allocution statements are admitted in 
the state's case-in-chief following reversal on appeal, the right to appeal becomes 
meaningless where the defendant admits guilt at sentencing. Defendants who do not 
receive a fair trial initially will never receive a fair trial based solely on evidence gathered 
by the state if allocution statements following the flawed trial are admitted. 
Any waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination which occurred in this case 
was limited to the hearing in which it was made. The scope of any waiver caused by 
Maestas5 allocution statements did not extend beyond the sentencing hearing, and the 
statements are therefore inadmissible at retrial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING MAESTAS THE USE OF AN EXPERT WITNESS TO 
ASSIST THE JURY IN UNDERSTANDING THE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
Maestas filed a "Notice of Intent to Use Expert Witness." R. 640-41. See 
Addendum G. The notice indicates that Maestas intended to call Dr. David Dodd, a 
psychology professor at the University of Utah who "specializes in eyewitness memory, 
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cognition and language, and language development" (R. 640), as an expert 
to testify relevant to eyewitness identification evidence, and particularly the 
unreliability of such evidence. Dr. Dodd would be expected to inform the 
jury of the general pitfalls and dangers of misidentification evidenced in the 
large body of empirical studies that have been conducted over the past 40 to 
50 years. Additionally, Dr. Dodd will relate particular studies and concerns 
to the circumstances surrounding the identification of the defendant by the 
witness(es) in this case, and give his conclusions relevant to the reliability 
of the identification procedure employed in this case. 
R. 640-41. 
After the state objected (R. 674-78), Maestas filed a "Supplementary Report of 
Defense Expert . . . ," a copy of which is in Addendum G. R. 716-17. That 
supplementary notice indicates that "Dr. Dodd's testimony would not only describe the 
various general issues and pitfalls besetting identification testimony, but would also 
include specific analogies between the facts of this case and the circumstances and 
settings of specific studies of which he has knowledge." R. 716. 
A letter from Dr. Dodd which accompanied the supplementary notice, a copy of 
which is in Addendum H, indicates that Dr. Dodd would testify generally about 
eyewitness testimony and the three stages of memory: acquisition, retention and retrieval. 
R. 720. The letter further addresses studies and information regarding the impact on 
acquisition caused by disguises, identification based on clothing, lighting conditions, 
duration of observation, attention, weapon focus, and fear or stress. R. 720-22. 
Dr. Dodd's letter also addresses the impact of suggestive events on retention and recent 
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studies which have been conducted in that area. R. 723-24. In regard to retrieval, the 
letter indicates that all of the factors which impact on retention and acquisition can 
impact on retrieval, and that the relationship between an individual's confidence in the 
identification and correctness of an identification can be extremely low. R. 724. The trial 
court denied Maestas' request that he be allowed to introduce expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identification in support of his theory of the case. See trial court's 
conclusions in support of this order at R. 67-68 in Addendum C. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. It states, f![i]f 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether expert testimony is admissible. 
State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). That discretion must be exercised, 
however, within the framework of the three-part test articulated in Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 
398-400. That test requires the trial court to determine whether: (1) "the scientific 
principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are inherently reliable" (State 
v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996)); (2) "the scientific principles or techniques at 
issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by sufficiently 
qualified experts" (id.); and (3) "the proffered scientific evidence will be more probative 
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than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. (citing 
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 398 n.8). The last consideration is based on the requirement of 
Utah R. Evid. 702 that the evidence assist the trier of fact, or, in other words, that it be 
helpful. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 398 n.8; see also Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1133. 
In this case, the state did not challenge the admission of the evidence under the 
first two Rimmasch prongs. R. 866; see findings and conclusions in Addendum C. The 
only issue before the trial court and this Court, then, is whether the evidence would be 
helpful, i.e., whether the expert testimony would be more probative than prejudicial. See 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n. 8. 
In order to be "helpful," expert testimony must convey information which is not 
ordinarily within the knowledge of the average juror. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
1361 (Utah 1993). 
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must first decide 
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average 
individual. Dixon [v. Stewart], 658 P.2d [59L] at 597 [(Utah 1982)]. It is 
not necessary that the subject matter be so erudite or arcane that the jurors 
could not possibly understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is 
it a requirement that the subject be beyond the comprehension of each and 
every juror. See id. 
Larsen. 865 P.2d at 1361. In other words, "'expert opinion is proper when it would help 
to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert 
and beyond the ken of the typical juror'... ." People v. Brooks, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 
(N.Y. 1985) (further citations omitted). 
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In Larsen, this Court held that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony in 
a securities fraud case "'because the technical nature of securities is not within the 
knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common experience and would 
help the jury understand the issues before them.511 Id (further citation omitted). Just as 
securities information is not average layman knowledge, correct information regarding 
the reliability of testimony is not within the knowledge of the average layman, as 
recognized by this Court in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986). 
Recognizing that jurors do not have accurate and complete information regarding 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have 
determined that expert testimony in this area "can provide significant assistance to the 
jury beyond that obtained through cross-examination and common sense." State v. 
Taylor, 749 P.2d 181, 184 (Wash. App. 1988) (citing inter alia United States v. Moore, 
786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Smith. 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984); State v. Chappie. 660 P.2d 1208 
(Ariz. 1983); People v. Brown. 726 P.2d 516 (Cal. 1985) (rev'd on other grounds. 107 
S.Ct 837 (1987); People v. McDonald. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); Brooks. 490 N.Y.S.2d 
692; State v. Buell. 489 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1986). California courts have fashioned a test 
for determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications: 
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the 
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prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving 
it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert 
testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could 
have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully 
known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude 
that testimony. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d at 727.* In the present case, expert testimony would be "helpful" to 
the jury since identification is the central issue, there is little other evidence linking 
Maestas to the crime, and the expert testimony related to factors which could have 
affected the accuracy of the identification. See McDonald, 690 P.2d at 727. 
The trial court based its conclusion that the evidence would not assist the trier of 
fact on a determination that (1) the testimony would be an inappropriate lecture, (2) the 
trial court, not an expert witness, was responsible for educating the jury, (3) concerns 
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identifications were adequately addressed 
through the use of a cautionary instruction and the suppression hearing, and (4) the jury 
1
 Washington courts apply a similar test under which an abuse of discretion in 
excluding expert testimony occurs f"(l) where the identification of the defendant is the 
principal issue at trial; (2) the defendant presents an alibi defense; and (3) there is little or 
no other evidence linking the defendant to the crime."1 Taylor, 749 P.2d at 184. The 
added requirement in Washington that the defendant must present an alibi defense is 
unwarranted. Expert testimony assists the jury just as much in a case involving a wrongly 
identified defendant who was alone at the time of the crime as it does in a case where the 
defendant was with others who can corroborate his whereabouts. Moreover, a jury is 
assisted by such evidence in any case where a defendant chooses to put the state to its 
burden of proof but does not testify regardless of whether the defendant puts on an 
affirmative alibi defense. While Maestas did present an alibi defense, the better approach 
in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in excluding such expert 
testimony is to not include that requirement. 
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might abdicate its responsibility if an expert testified. R.867-68. The trial court's 
conclusions were incorrect since educating the jury through expert testimony is an 
appropriate and helpful way for the defendant to present his theory of the case. The 
purpose of expert testimony is to educate the jury regarding an area with which it is likely 
to be unfamiliar. Expert testimony, even expert testimony which embraces an ultimate 
issue and is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 704, is admitted without the jury abdicating 
its role. See United States v. Langford. 802 F.2d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting) (pointing out that the rationale that expert testimony is inadmissible because it 
invades the province of the jury "has been discredited and rejected by scholars, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court.")2 In addition, the use of a cautionary 
instruction and the court's consideration of whether to suppress the identification do not 
fully address the concerns regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification and, while 
2
 Regarding the rejection of the usurping the jury role rationale, Judge Ferguson 
elaborated: 
Dean Wigmore claimed that the jury function reasoning is a "mere bit of empty 
rhetoric." 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence Trials at Common Law Sec. 1920, at 18 (J. 
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978). The Federal Rules of Evidence have eliminated this 
rationale as a permissible objection to opinion evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) 
("[Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact."); see also United States v. Rogers. 769 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985). The 
Supreme Court rejected similar arguments in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 
899, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3397-98, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) ("We are not persuaded 
that [psychiatric evaluations of dangerousness are] almost entirely unreliable and 
that the fact finder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, 
recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings"). 
Langford, 802 F.2d at 1183-84 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
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necessary so as to adequately guide the jury and avoid a due process violation, do not 
provide a substitute for expert testimony. 
Despite this Court's decisions in Long, Maestas and State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1991), recognizing the fallibility of identification testimony and factors 
affecting the reliability of such testimony, as well as the "dramatic transformation" which 
has occurred in "[cjourts' treatments of expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification . . . in the past twenty years" (United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311 
(6th Cir. 2000)), the trial judge in this case harkened back to two Utah cases decided 
almost twenty years ago to support his conclusion that expert testimony was not 
admissible. Although State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) (rev'd on other 
grounds, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)) and State v.Griffm, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert identification testimony 
under the circumstances of those cases, both cases were decided prior to the significant 
shift and divergent analytical course which emerged in Long. That significant shift and 
divergent analytical course require that relevant expert testimony be admitted in cases 
where eyewitness identification is a central issue and little other evidence links the 
defendant to the crime. 
This Court's decisions in Long, Ramirez and Maestas were based on a review of 
the "empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identifications [ ] " 
(Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 488); Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ffl[ 25-
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28) and a determination that the unreliability of such evidence required an approach 
which diverged from prior practice. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. In Long, this Court 
reviewed the research regarding human memory and eyewitness identification, 
recognizing "human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and 
fallible." Long, 721 P.2d at 488. Although the research shows that eyewitness 
identifications are often unreliable, "juries have a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications" and "because jurors do not appreciate the 
fallibility of such identifications, they often give eyewitness testimony undue weight." 
Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^26 , 27 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 490). 
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses 
inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware 
of these problems. People simply do not accurately understand the 
deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the 
memory process of an honest eyewitness. Moreover, the common 
knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to documented 
research findings. 
Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^27 (citation omitted). 
The increased awareness as to the fallibility of eyewitness identification created by 
the studies referenced in Long as well as the concern that jurors5 common beliefs about 
the reliability of an identification may actually be contrary to the research findings led 
this Court to reassess its approach to the use of cautionary eyewitness identification 
instructions. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Because of the risk that eyewitness testimony would 
be given undue weight by uninformed and misguided jurors, this Court concluded "that, 
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at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is 
warranted " and "abandoned] [the] discretionary approach to cautionary jury 
instructions/1 instead directing that "trial courts shall give such an instruction whenever 
eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is 
requested by the defense." Id.; see also Maestas, 1999 UT 32, YP6-31: Ramirez. 817 
P.2d at 778. 
The concerns about the fallibility of eyewitness identification expressed in Utah 
case law since the Griffin and Malmrose decisions as well as recent studies regarding the 
significant number of wrongful convictions which have been based on faulty eyewitness 
identification testimony (see Andrew R. Tillman, Expert testimony on Eyewitness 
identification: The Constitution Savs, "Let the Experts Speak," 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 735, 736 
(1989); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological 
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol. and the L. 765-791 (1995)) 
require that a trial judge take into account this Court's teachings and allow expert 
testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony in cases where 
identification is a central issue. Not only is such evidence "helpful" to a jury, it is 
essential to a defendant's ability to present a defense since without such testimony, a 
jury's misconceptions rather than relevant evidence could determine the outcome. See, 
generally, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,19 (1967) (a criminal defendant has the 
right to present a defense). 
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Utah is not unique in grappling with the transformation in case law which has 
occurred as our understanding of this area has increased. In Smithers, the Sixth Circuit 
conducted an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of case law in this area and held that 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to present expert 
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. In reaching that conclusion, the 
Smithers court noted that in the 1970's when lawyers began raising this issue, "courts 
were uniformly skeptical about admitting such testimony, elaborating a host of reasons 
why eyewitness experts should not be allowed to testify." Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311. By 
the 1980fs, the trend shifted toward allowing the use of eyewitness expert testimony. Id. 
(citing inter alia Moore, 786 F.2d at 1313; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232; Smith, 736 F.2d 
at 1107; Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795). In fact, "several courts have held that it is an abuse of 
discretion to exclude such expert testimony." Id. at 4 (citing United States v. Stevens, 
935 F.2d 1380, 1400-01 (3d Cir. 1991); Smith, 736 F.2d at 1107; Downing, 753 F.2d at 
1232; Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208). "This jurisprudential trend is not surprising in light of 
modem scientific studies which show that, while juries rely heavily on eyewitness 
testimony, it can be untrustworthy under certain circumstances." IdL 
Since the early 1980fs, a number of decisions have recognized the problems 
associated with eyewitness testimony which were acknowledged by this Court in Long, 
and have held that a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit expert testimony 
in light of those problems. See e ^ Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311; Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1400-
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01; Downing. 753 F.2d at 1232; Taylor. 749 P.2d at 184-85; McDonald. 690 P.2d at 709; 
Chappie. 660 P.2d at 1218-23; see also Smith. 736 F.2d at 1103 (expert eyewitness 
identification testimony met "helpfulness" requirement and was improperly excluded); 
Brooks. 490 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (expert testimony regarding reliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony is admissible). The trial judge abused his discretion in this case 
where identification is a central issue, there is little evidence other than the identification 
testimony linking Maestas to the crimes, and the defense sought to have Dr. Dodd testify 
regarding factors which could have affected the reliability of the identifications. 
First, there is no question that identification is the central issue in this case. As this 
Court has already recognized, ff[t]he only defense available to Maestas at trial was the 
unreliability of the eyewitness identifications." Maestas. 1999 UT 32, ^|25. 
Second, this Court has also already concluded that the other evidence in this case 
is not conclusive or overwhelming. Id at ffl|29-31, 34-36. This Court outlined the other 
evidence supporting the conviction as follows: 
Harbrecht observed the robber getting into a Camaro-the same make of 
automobile driven by Maestas at the time of his arrest. Hot air and a warm 
hood indicated that the Camaro had recently been driven, contrary to 
Maestas' testimony that he remained at Sisneros' apartment all evening. 
Officer Cole recovered "several" crumpled dollar bills from the front seat of 
Maestas' Camaro-the robber took (exactly) five crumpled dollar bills from 
Kara Hsiao during the Pizza Hut robbery. Some of the witnesses identified 
the coat found in Maestas' car as the one worn by the robber. A search of 
Sisneros' apartment revealed a dark neck gator capable of being used as a 
mask and a hat that some of the eyewitnesses claimed the robber wore. 
25 
Id. at ^ 35. Even more compelling to this Court in assessing prejudice, however, was 
evidence regarding what officers did not find to link Maestas to the robberies. 
The foregoing circumstantial evidence is inconclusive when viewed 
in light of what the officers did not find. Each eyewitness testified that the 
robber used a gun. No gun was found. The Pizza Hut employees indicated 
that the robber stole at least $15 in loose change. No change was found on 
Maestas or Sisneros, in his car, or in Sisneros' apartment. Only $53 was 
recovered from Sisneros and/or from Maestas' car, whereas over $200 was 
taken in the robberies. No money was found in the apartment. The officers 
also did not find the bags used in the robberies or the day planner pouch 
stolen from Candace Hsiao. Maestas was not wearing clothing consistent 
with the descriptions of the robber at the time of his arrest, nor did the 
searches of Maestas5 car and Sisneros' apartment locate such clothing. 
Maestas' car, although the same make as the one used in the Top Stop 
robbery, was a low-rider with chrome wheels; it did not match the 
description of the car seen leaving the Top Stop as to year and color. On 
balance, we find that the circumstantial evidence against Maestas is not 
overwhelming or conclusive. 
Id, at Tf36. 
Third, the defense sought to present expert testimony which was relevant and 
material since it related to the factors which might have affected the reliability of the 
identifications in this case. As this Court recognized in Maestas, 
[N]one of the identifications in this case were impervious to attack under 
the criteria set forth in Long. All of the witnesses had a limited opportunity 
to observe the robber; the robberies were completed quickly and the 
robber's face and head were covered. Additionally, at least some of the 
witnesses were making a cross-racial identification. Some of the witnesses 
testified to being very afraid or fixating on the weapon rather than on the 
robber. Furthermore, as set forth above, most, if not all, the witnesses' 
identifications were tainted by a highly suggestive show-up prior to the 
lineup in which they selected him. 
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Id. at f29. In addition, this Court appears to have approved the use of expert testimony in 
this case . In support of its determination that original counsel "did nothing to focus the 
jury's attention on the limitations of eyewitness identification," this Court pointed out 
that, among other things, "[c]ounsel did not present expert testimony regarding the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification." Id., ^30. 
Maestas has a due process right to present evidence in support of his theory of the 
case. See State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
("The right of a defendant to produce evidence in his own behalf is one of the most 
fundamental aspects of a fair trial"); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 353, 34 
L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (same); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19 (same). This Court has 
already recognized that the defense theory in this case was "that Maestas was mistakenly 
identified as the robber." Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^ 34. As defense counsel argued below, 
Dr. Dodd's testimony was the only means by which Maestas could folly and adequately 
present his defense. R. 717. 
Dr. Dodd's expert testimony is the only means by which the 
defendant's theory of the case can be folly and adequately presented. 
Absent expert testimony and the inclusion by reference of the many 
particular studies that confirm the existence of serious pitfalls in eyewitness 
identification, the defense will have only the argument to the jury - which 
the jury will be instructed is not evidence. Expert witness testimony is 
especially important in a case like this one in that there is no direct evidence 
tying the defendant to the crimes, and eyewitness identification has been 
shown to be not only prone to error, such error has been shown to be 
exacerbated by the fact that jurors tend to actually over-emphasize the 
reliability and credibility of eyewitness identification. That is the reason 
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that special instructions are required in cases like this one. [ ]. However, 
jury instructions alone would be insufficient to safeguard against the pitfalls 
of I.D. testimony, because the jury will have nothing that is actually in 
evidence. . . . 
R.717. 
Dr. Dodd's testimony is critical to Maestas' presentation of his defense. For 
example, while the instruction will tell the jury that it can consider whether the witness 
had an adequate opportunity to observe the robber and that a consideration of the extent 
to which the actor's features were visible and undisguised figures into that consideration, 
Dr. Dodd would give the jury evidence as to how disguises impact on identification. 
Specifically, Dr. Dodd's proffer indicates that he would discuss studies showing the level 
of incorrect identification when such a small part of the face is seen, the lower accuracy 
in identification which occurs when only part of the face is viewed because facial 
perception depends upon the ability to view the entire face, and information indicating 
that while it is possible that witnesses could accurately remember the eyes of the robber, 
such an accurate memory is "seemingly remote11 when only the eyes are viewed. This 
testimony is material and relevant to the identification testimony the judge has allowed as 
well as to the testimony by witnesses whose identification testimony has been suppressed 
since some of those witnesses describe facial characteristics and eyes. 
Dr. Dodd also proffered that he would testify regarding "weapon focus" and stress 
and fear, and the impairment on memory these can cause. Based only on the instruction, 
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the jurors might decide that weapon focus and stress and fear heightened the ability to 
make an accurate identification; Dr. Dodd's testimony would clarify that these actually 
can impair memory. See Long. 721 P.2d at 488-89. 
Dr. Dodd also would testify regarding the impact of the showup on memory. This 
testimony includes not only information that the way in which the witness is asked to 
make the identification can be suggestive and cause an inaccurate identification to be 
made, but also that after an individual is subjected to suggestive influences, memories can 
"merge" and result in incorrect identifications. In this case, where most of the witnesses 
were subjected to the showup, this expert testimony would be particularly helpful. 
The trial judge has suppressed the identification testimony of three individuals 
because those identifications were so unreliable that admitting them would have violated 
due process. R. 710-12. Nevertheless, the judge is allowing each of these witnesses to 
describe specific features she might recall about the robber. R. 710-12. In addition, the 
judge has admitted the identification testimony of four witnesses (R. 709-14) which is not 
"impervious to attack under the criteria set forth in Long." Maestas, 1999 UT 32, [^29. 
While the suppression order prevents the jury from hearing three witnesses give 
wholly unreliable identification testimony, the concerns regarding the unreliability of 
identification testimony nevertheless remain in this case. The three witnesses who cannot 
give identification testimony will be able to give descriptions which they may have 
arrived at due to suggestive influences or other memory impairing experiences. The other 
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four witnesses will be allowed to identify Maestas even though the reliability of those 
identifications can be attacked. The Ramirez hearing will have no impact on the jury's 
knowledge of factors that might affect the reliability of this remaining evidence. 
Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that the Ramirez hearing helped address the 
concerns that Appellant seeks to address with expert testimony is incorrect. 
The trial court's conclusion that the use of a cautionary instruction coupled with 
the Ramirez hearing will adequately inform the jurors of the pitfalls of eyewitness 
testimony (R. 867) is likewise incorrect since the instruction merely tells the jury things it 
might consider and is not evidence, let alone evidence in support of Maestas' defense 
theory. For example, the typical cautionary instruction, as set forth in Long, 721 P.2d at 
494 n.8, tells the jury it should consider whether the witness had the capacity to observe 
the person committing the crime, then tells the jury to consider whether the witness was 
impaired by stress or fright. Without expert testimony, an uneducated jury may well 
decide that a witness was under stress, but that the stress actually heightened the capacity 
to observe. Such a determination is contrary to the studies but allowed by the instruction. 
See Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89. 
While the Ramirez hearing and the cautionary instruction did begin to address 
Maestas' concerns, they did not aid in presenting evidence regarding his theory to the 
jury. In this case where identification is the central issue, there is little other evidence 
linking Maestas to the robberies, and the expert's testimony is relevant and material, the 
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trial judge erred in refusing to allow Maestas to introduce expert testimony in support of 
his defense. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE STATE MAY 
INTRODUCE AS PART OF ITS CASE-IN-CHIEF AT RETRIAL 
APPELLANT'S INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE IN THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT AND AT SENTENCING VIOLATES 
MAESTAS' FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, RIGHT TO APPEAR AND DEFEND. RIGHT TO 
APPEAL, AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. 
After he was convicted at the original trial, Maestas took responsibility for the 
crimes and made incriminating statements in a Statement of the Offense form which he 
was asked to fill out as part of the presentence investigation, and to the trial judge at 
sentencing. R. 672-73, 537-38, 855; see Addendum H. The trial judge ruled that those 
statements are admissible in the state's case-in-chief on retrial. R. 853-858, 861-62. 
There is no Utah case law, and very little case law elsewhere, addressing the issue 
of whether a criminal defendant's incriminating statements which are made as part of the 
sentencing process can be used against him at a subsequent trial after the case is reversed 
on appeal. See Harvev v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1093 (Wyo. 1992) ("Harvey") 
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (indicating that a similar issue was one of "total first 
impression"); but see State v. Drake. 552 A.2d 780 (Vt. 1988) (holding defendant's 
allocution statements are not admissible at subsequent criminal proceedings). The dearth 
of case law in this area may exist because the use of such sentencing statements after a 
defendant's conviction is overturned is so foreign to our system of justice and so 
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obviously conflicts with fundamental constitutional protections that prosecutors do not 
even attempt to use such statements, or if they do, that attempt is denied by the trial court. 
See e.g. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 315, 119 S.Ct.1307, 143 L.Ed.2d424, 
430 (1999) (recognizing "the long tradition and vital principle that criminal proceedings 
rely on accusations proved by the Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance 
its own prosecutorial power"). Allowing the state to use Maestas' allocution statements 
in its case-in-chief on retrial violates Maestas5 Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination, rights to defend and appeal, and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) (1999). 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-l(5)(d) (1999) PRECLUDES THE USE 
AT RETRIAL OF STATEMENTS MADE BY MAESTAS AS PART OF 
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) (1999) limits the use which can be made of a 
presentence investigation report and precludes the use of the statements made by Maestas 
as part of that report at trial. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) states: 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including 
any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-
404, are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes 
of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) (1999) (emphasis added). 
The Statement of the Offense form filled out by Maestas lfin response to AP&P's 
request for information relevant to preparation of the presentence report" (R. 855) was 
included in the presentence report and therefore is part of the contents that report. R. 177; 
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see Addendum H. Section 77-18-l(5)(d) mandates that the contents of presentence 
investigation reports are to be used solely for the purposes of sentencing. Pursuant to 
Section 77-18-l(5)(d), therefore, the Maestas' statement of the offense, found in the 
presentence report, cannot be used at retrial. 
In addition, the Code of Judicial Administration further demonstrates that the 
contents of presentence investigation reports may not be used as evidence at trial. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-202.02(6)(C), presentence reports are "controlled 
judicial records." Access to "controlled judicial records" is limited, and any "person who 
receives a controlled judicial record may not disclose controlled information from that 
record to any person, including the subject of the record." Utah R. Jud. Admin. 
4-202.03 (6)(D). Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-202.03 is intended to "provide for or limit access 
to records created or maintained by the judicial branch." Subsection (6) limits the access 
to controlled judicial records as follows. 
(6) Controlled judicial records. Upon request, the judicial branch shall 
disclose a controlled judicial record to the following: 
(A) counsel for the subject of the record in the proceeding; 
(B) the individual who submitted the record; 
(C) a physician, psychologist, or certified social worker upon 
submission of a notarized release from the subject of the record that 
is dated no more than 90 days prior to the date the request is made 
and a signed acknowledgment of the terms of disclosure of 
controlled information as provided below; or 
(D) any person to whom the record must be provided pursuant to a 
court order. 
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A person who receives a controlled judicial record may not disclose 
controlled information from that record to any person, including the subject 
of that record. 
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-202.03(6)(D). 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d), which is bolstered by the 
Rules of Judicial Administration, precludes the use at retrial of the Maestas' statement of 
the offense which is contained in the presentence investigation report. The trial court's 
ruling that the Statement of Offense form filled out by Maestas at the request of the 
presentence investigator could be used at retrial requires reversal. 
B. THE STATE'S USE OF MAESTAS' STATEMENTS AT 
SENTENCING AND IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT IN ITS CASE-
IN-CHIEF ON RETRIAL VIOLATES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT; IT 
ALSO VIOLATES HIS RIGHTS TO ALLOCUTION AND APPEAL. 
The trial court's ruling that the state can use Maestas' statements which were made 
as part of the sentencing process after the original trial in its case-in-chief on retrial 
violates the Fifth Amendment since Maestas did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the 
right not to be compelled to give evidence against himself at a subsequent trial when he 
made those statements at sentencing. The scope of any waiver of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege was limited to the use of Maestas' statements for sentencing purposes, and the 
statements were tainted by the fruit of the poisonous tree since Maestas did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel at the original trial. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that Mno 
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person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The 
Fifth Amendment protection applies at trial, at sentencing, and even while a case is on 
appeal following conviction (see Mitchell 143 L.Ed.2d at 430), and precludes the use of 
statements made by Maestas as part of the sentencing process against him as part of the 
state's case-in-chief at a subsequent retrial. Although there is a presumption against 
waiver of a constitutional right (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938)), the trial judge 
concluded that Maestas waived his right against self-incrimination at any subsequent 
retrial when he took responsibility for the crimes at sentencing even though there is 
nothing in the record suggesting that Maestas was informed that he had a right to appeal 
his convictions, or that he had any idea that his sentencing statements could be used 
against him at a subsequent trial if his conviction were reversed on appeal. The trial 
court's ruling conflicts with courts' "duty to ensure that the administration of justice in 
[Utah] operates as fairly as possible" and should be overturned. See Drake, 552 A.2d at 
780 (holding that fairness requires that defendant's statements at sentencing not be 
admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings except for impeachment or rebuttal). 
The marshaled evidence and findings in support of the trial court's conclusion that 
Maestas knowingly and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination at any 
subsequent trial is as follows3: 
3
 The determination as to whether Maestas knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination is a legal conclusion. See, generally. State v. Dutchie. 
969 P.2d 422,427 (Utah 1998) (trial court's determination of valid waiver ofMiranda 
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1. Maestas testified under oath at the original trial that he did not 
commit the robberies. R. 854. 
2. Maestas "tried to gain advantage with the jury by swearing under 
oath that he had not robbed the Top Stop or the persons at the Pizza Hut 
restaurant." R. 854. 
3. There is nothing in the record suggesting that the presentence 
investigator used coercive tactics in requesting a statement of the offense 
from Maestas. 
4. There is nothing in the record suggesting that the police, state, or 
court used coercive tactics to force Maestas to make a statement at 
sentencing. R. 856. 
5. Maestas made his allocution statements in an effort to obtain 
leniency in sentencing. R. 856. 
These findings do not support the larger incorrect conclusion made by the trial judge that 
the exercise of the right to allocution at sentencing constitutes a waiver of the right 
against self-incrimination at a subsequent retrial. 
Maestas' allocution statements were not a voluntary waiver of the right against 
self-incrimination since the trial court could impose a harsher sentence if he did not 
confess to the crimes. This Court has upheld the practice of penalizing a defendant who 
does not take responsibility for his crimes or, conversely, rewarding with a lighter 
rights is reviewed for correctness). The trial court's "findings" that "[njothing in the court 
record suggests that defendant's written statement [to the presentence investigator] was 
not voluntary" and Maestas' statement made at sentencing was voluntary are actually 
legal conclusions which should be reviewed for correctness. Moreover, those "findings" 
of voluntariness are erroneous because, among other things, the trial court could sentence 
Maestas more harshly if he did not take responsibility at sentencing. 
36 
sentence or better conditions the defendant who does take responsibility. See e ^ State v. 
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) (upholding trial court's imposition of a harsher 
sentence based in part on the defendant's failure to take responsibility for the crime); 
State v. Gallu 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (defendant's acceptance of responsibility 
for the crimes weighed in favor of overturning the consecutive sentences). Since Utah 
sentencing judges can consider whether a defendant takes responsibility for a crime in 
assessing the harshness of the sentence to be imposed and can penalize a defendant who 
does not admit his guilt, allocution statements made at sentencing implicate the Fifth 
Amendment and are not a voluntary waiver of the right against self-incrimination. See 
Shumpert v. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.. 409 S.E.2d 771, 774 (S.C. 1991) 
(recognizing that waiver of the Fifth Amendment does not occur where exercise is 
"needlessly chilled" and incriminating statements are encouraged). Maestas' allocution 
statements were not voluntary regardless of whether the judge or presentence investigator 
used coercive tactics since the potential penalty for not taking responsibility creates an 
inherent coercion. The fact that Maestas made allocution statements to obtain leniency 
highlights the lack of voluntariness rather than demonstrating a valid waiver. 
Maestas' statements also were not a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right 
against self-incrimination in light of the fact that the conviction, which was the basis for 
the sentencing statements, was later overturned because Maestas received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Statements which are made as part of plea bargaining or at a plea 
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hearing when the plea is later withdrawn are not admissible at trial. See Utah R. Evid. 
410; Standen v. State, 710 P.2d 718 (Nev. 1985) (guilty plea which is later withdrawn is 
"deemed never to have existed" and is not admissible at a subsequent trial); State v. 
Jensen, 279 P. 506 (Utah 1929) (withdrawn plea no longer existed and therefore could not 
be used as evidence at a subsequent trial; admitting plea as evidence would put "petitioner 
in a dilemma utterly inconsistent with the determination of the court awarding him a 
trial"); Gunsbv v. Wainwright 596 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir. 1979) (sentencing statements 
which were made based on a belief that a legal plea was in place were not knowing and 
voluntary where plea was later withdrawn). Statements made at sentencing following a 
flawed trial are likewise not knowing and voluntary since they are made based on the 
existence of a conviction, and without knowledge that the conviction is flawed and will 
be overturned for a new trial. 
Moreover, statements which are made at plea discussions and plea hearings are not 
admitted at a later trial after plea negotiations fail in order to promote plea discussions 
and openness during plea negotiations and at plea hearings. See State v. Pearson, 818 
P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1991). The same policy for promoting openness exists in a 
sentencing hearing. In order to folly and fairly sentence an individual, a trial judge needs 
complete information, including information from the defendant as to whether he or she 
takes responsibility for the crime. If this Court were to uphold the trial court's ruling in 
this case, this policy would be undermined. Indeed, any defendant who was appealing his 
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or her case would simply assert the Fifth Amendment, and trial judges would be left 
without valuable information needed for a full and fair sentencing. 
The "fruit of the poisonous tree'1 doctrine likewise demonstrates that statements 
made as part of the sentencing process are not admissible at retrial after a conviction is 
overturned on appeal. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 497 
(1968); Harrison v. United States. 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968); 
Harvey. 835 P.2d at 1096 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). In Harrison, after the government 
introduced three illegally obtained confessions, the defendant testified in order to explain 
his statements. After the conviction was overturned on appeal, the government 
introduced the defendant's testimony at retrial. Although the lower court determined that 
the defendant had made a conscious decision to testify, the United States Supreme Court 
clarified that f,[t]he question is not whether the petitioner made a knowing decision to 
testify, but why. If he did so in order to overcome the impact of confessions illegally 
obtained and hence improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted by the same 
illegality that rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible." Harrison. 392 U.S. at 
223 (emphasis in original). Rather than concluding that the defendant waived his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, the high Court held that the defendant's testimony was tainted by 
the underlying illegality and inadmissible. See Harrison. 392 U.S. at 222-23. 
The same rationale applies to this case. Maestas admitted guilt as part of the 
sentencing process in order to ameliorate his sentence after the flawed conviction. 
39 
Maestas' statements to the presentence investigator and sentencing judge were tainted by 
the same illegality that caused a new trial to be ordered, i.e. the violation of Maestas' 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and are therefore inadmissible at retrial. 
A knowing and voluntary waiver of the right against self-incrimination also did not 
occur due to the ineffective assistance of counsel Maestas received in this case. This 
Court has already concluded that he received ineffective assistance at trial. Nothing in 
the record suggests any awareness by Maestas at the original sentencing of the ineffective 
assistance provided by his original lawyer. In addition, nothing in the record suggests 
that Maestas was advised of his right to appeal, and Maestas was forced to file a petition 
for post-conviction relief in order to pursue his original appeal of right. Since original 
counsel was apparently not advising Maestas of his own ineffectiveness nor helping him 
pursue an appeal, Maestas' decision to speak at sentencing was not a knowing waiver of 
his right against self-incrimination. There is also nothing in the record suggesting that 
Maestas had any awareness that statements made at sentencing would be used against him 
at a subsequent trial if he were to prevail on appeal. 
Maestas' statements at sentencing also were not a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of his right against self-incrimination because of the competing constitutional rights 
criminal defendants would be forced to choose between if, in fact, statements admitting 
guilt at sentencing were admissible at a later trial. See Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377, 393-94, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (Court considered "it intolerable 
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that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another11). In 
Simmons, the Court held that a defendant's testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing 
was not admissible at trial. It reasoned that in order to establish standing to raise a Fourth 
Amendment claim, a defendant "was obliged either to give up what he believed, with 
advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination" if defendant's testimony at the 
suppression hearing could be used against him at trial. Id. Since requiring a defendant to 
sacrifice one right in order to assert another was unconstitutional, the Court held that a 
defendant's testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing could be used only for the limited 
purpose of determining the issues raised in that pretrial motion. 
The situation in this case is substantially similar to that in Simmons. If the trial 
judge's ruling is upheld, a defendant who is convicted of a crime and appealing that 
conviction must surrender either the right to speak on his behalf at sentencing on the 
original conviction or the right against self-incrimination as well as the right to a 
meaningful appeal. 
While there has been some discussion in case law from this Court as to whether 
the right to allocution at sentencing is based on the due process clauses of the state or 
federal constitution4, there is no question that such a right exists in Utah. See State v. 
4
 Because Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) 
guarantee the right to allocution, that right is part of the process due defendants in Utah. 
Although it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether state and federal due process 
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Young, 853 P.2d 327, 370-73 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(joined by Stewart, J., and Zimmerman, J., in the result). That right at the very least is 
found in Utah R. Crim P. 22(a), which gives a criminal defendant the right to make a 
statement and present any information in mitigation of sentence prior to sentencing. 
Moreover, following Young, this Court unanimously concluded that the right to 
allocution "is an inseparable part of the right to be present" which is found in Article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1111 (Utah 1996). 
Because the Article I, section 12 guarantee of "the right to appear and defend in person" 
extends to sentencing (id.femphasis added)), the right to allocution is constitutionally 
independently guarantee such a right, Maestas maintains that both constitutions guarantee 
a due process right to allocution. While federal due process is not violated when a judge 
fails "to ask whether the defendant would like to make a statement prior to sentencing," 
the United States Supreme Court expressly left open the issue of "whether denying 
allocution to a defendant who has affirmatively requested it is constitutional error." 
Young, 853 P.2d at 376 (Durham, J., dissenting and concurring) (citing Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468,7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962); see also Boardman v. 
Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (further citation omitted). Various courts 
have held that due process is violated when a defendant is not allowed to exercise the 
right to allocution. See e^ g, Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978); 
Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1530; United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d654, 656 (5th Cir. 1991). A 
majority of this Court has held that a statutory right to allocution exists in Utah. See 
Young, 853 P.2d at 376 (Durham, J., dissenting and concurring) (concluding that 
statutory and constitutional right to allocution exists) (joined by Zimmerman, J., and 
Stewart, J., agreeing that statutory right to allocution exists and not reaching 
constitutional issues); see also State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388,1390 (Utah 1988) 
(referring to "defendant's due process right of allocution" without analyzing the issue). 
The state due process clause, Article I, section 7, as well as the Article I, section 12 right 
to appear and defend in person, likewise guarantees a constitutional right to allocution. 
See Young, 853 P.2d at 377 (Durham, J., dissenting and concurring); State v. Anderson. 
929P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1996). 
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guaranteed in Utah. 
Maestas exercised his statutory and constitutional right to allocution in this case by 
speaking at sentencing in an effort to defend himself and obtain a less harsh sentence. 
The trial judge concluded that by exercising his right to speak at sentencing, Maestas 
sacrificed his right against self-incrimination. As the United States Supreme Court 
recognized in Simmons, requiring a criminal defendant to sacrifice one right in order to 
exercise another is intolerable and violates due process. Moreover, the existence of these 
competing rights further demonstrates that any decision made by Maestas to speak at 
sentencing was not knowing and voluntary. 
In addition to forcing a criminal defendant to choose between the right to 
allocution and the right against self-incrimination, the trial judge's ruling forces a 
defendant to choose between the right to allocution and a fair sentencing, and the right to 
an effective appeal and a fair trial. See Harvey, 835 P.2d at 1097 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that if allocution statements are admissible at future trial, right to 
meaningful appeal and fair trial if case is reversed are foreclosed). If a conviction is 
reversed on appeal after a criminal defendant admits guilt at sentencing and the state is 
allowed to introduce evidence of that admission, the state will have no difficulty 
obtaining a conviction. Use of the confession from the initial sentencing effectively 
nullifies the right to appeal since a new trial is a needless exercise in the face of such 
evidence. The trial judge's ruling that Maestas' allocution statements can be used at trial 
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is "utterly inconsistent" with this Court's decision to grant a new trial. See Gunsby, 596 
F.2dat655. 
Moreover, in cases such as this where a conviction is overturned because the initial 
trial was not fair, a defendant has no hope of ever obtaining a fair trial based on the 
evidence apart from incriminating statements taken at sentencing if allocution statements 
are admissible at trial. Hence, pursuant to the trial judge's ruling, a defendant who 
chooses allocution also gives up his right to a fair trial and appeal. Such a sacrifice is 
intolerable and further demonstrates that Maestas did not knowingly and voluntarily 
waive his right against self-incrimination. 
Any arguable waiver of the right against self-incrimination which may have 
occurred in this case was limited to a waiver for the purposes of the sentencing hearing. 
Courts have recognized in a variety of contexts in criminal proceedings that the scope of a 
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the hearing in which the statement 
is made. See e ^ Mitchell 526 U.S. 314 (defendant who pleads guilty does not waive 
privilege against self-incrimination for sentencing purposes); Estelle v. Smith. 451 U.S. 
454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (incriminating statements which are made to 
psychiatrist during competency review do not waive Fifth Amendment); Simmons . 390 
U.S. 377 (waiver of privilege in suppression hearing is limited to that hearing); United 
States v. Buonos, 693 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1982) (statements made by a defendant at a 
bail hearing are not admissible at trial); United States v. Licavolh 604 F.2d 613, 623 
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(9th Cir. 1979) (waiver of the right against self-incrimination is limited to the proceeding 
in which it occurs); State v. Loveland, 684 A.2d 272, 278 (Vt. 1996) (admissions by sex 
offender at sentencing and for completion of probation cannot be used against him in 
future criminal proceeding). A defendant who exercises his right to allocution at 
sentencing likewise waives the right against self-incrimination only for sentencing 
purposes. The "fair administration of justice" requires that a defendant's allocution 
statements not be admissible in a subsequent retrial. See Drake, 552 A.2d at 780. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(d) also demonstrates that Maestas' allocution statements are 
not admissible on retrial. Rule 24(d) states: "[i]f a new trial is granted, the party shall be 
in the same position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or 
mentioned either in evidence or in argument." If statements made by a defendant as part 
of sentencing were used on retrial, a defendant would not "be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held." Even if the language of Rule 24(d) were limited to convictions 
which were overturned based on motions for new trial rather than appeal, due process and 
equal protection inequities would exist if defendants whose convictions were overturned 
on appeal were treated disparately.5 
5
 The fact that Maestas testified at trial does not change the analysis as to whether 
he waived his protection against self-incrimination when he made inculpatory statements 
as part of the sentencing process. Maestas is not arguing that the state could not introduce 
his trial testimony. Instead, he is arguing that the state cannot introduce incriminating 
statements made at sentencing for sentencing purposes. Just as the privilege against self-
incrimination is not waived for sentencing purposes when a defendant pleads guilty, it is 
not waived for sentencing purposes when he testifies at trial. See Mitchell 526 U.S. 314 
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In Harvey, 835 P.2d 1080-81, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed an issue 
similar to the one in this case, and held that the state could use defendant's allocution 
statements as evidence in a future trial.6 Harvey involved a high publicity case in 
Wyoming where the defendant was originally charged with kidnaping and sexual assault. 
Id. at 1076. The defendant was convicted by a jury and made allocution statements to the 
sentencing judge. IdL at 1080-81. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the convictions 
on speedy trial grounds, and the charges of sexual assault and kidnaping were dismissed. 
Id. at 1076. The state then charged Harvey with conspiracy to commit kidnaping and 
sexual assault based on the same incident. Id. At trial on the conspiracy charges, the 
state introduced defendant's allocution statements made following the kidnaping and 
sexual assault trial. Id. at 1080-81. The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the convictions 
despite claims that Harvey's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was 
(defendant who pleads guilty does not waive privilege for sentencing purposes); Harrison, 
392 U.S. at 222. 
6
 In a rather cursory fashion, the Tenth Circuit upheld this decision in Harvey v. 
Shillinger. 76 F.3d 1528, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1996). The Court concluded that Harvey 
conceded that his statements were voluntarily made, and that the statements were 
knowingly and intentionally made since Harvey was represented by counsel and made the 
statements under oath. By contrast, in this case, Maestas argues that his statements were 
not a voluntary waiver of his right against self-incrimination, that the statements were not 
a knowing waiver due to his deprivations of effective assistance of counsel, the tainted 
original conviction, his lack of knowledge as to his right to appeal, and other factors. 
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit did not consider the limited scope of the waiver and issued 
its decisions prior to Mitchell. The Tenth Circuit decision does not offer a compelling 
analysis for concluding that Maestas waived his right against self-incrimination at any 
future trial when he made allocution statements as part of the sentencing process. 
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violated. Id at 1084. 
In concluding that error did not occur in allowing the state to use the defendant's 
allocution statements as evidence, the majority took the simplistic view that n[a] 
defendant's choice to exercise his right to allocution is entirely voluntary." Id. at 1082. 
In Utah, however, a defendant's decision to speak at sentencing is not entirely voluntary 
since a defendant can be penalized for not taking responsibility at sentencing for the 
crimes for which he was convicted. See discussion supra at 36-37. The majority in 
Harvey recognized that if the trial judge could consider whether the defendant admitted 
guilt in assessing sentence, as is the case in Utah, the statements would not be voluntary. 
Harvey, 835 P.2d at 1083. The Harvey majority stated, "if the trial court were to require a 
defendant to confess to criminal activities in his allocution in return for a more lenient 
sentence, those statements would amount to 'genuine compulsion of testimony' in 
violation of the right against self-incrimination." Harvey, 835 P.2d at 1083 (citing 
Washington, 431 U.S. at 187, 97 S.Ct. at 1818; United States v. Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302, 
312 (5th Cir. 1974)). Hence, pursuant to the majority decision in Harvey, Maestas' 
statements to the sentencing judge were not a voluntary waiver of his right against self-
incrimination since the sentencing judge was allowed to consider whether the defendant 
confessed to the crime in assessing the harshness of the sentence. 
Moreover, the Harvey court did not consider whether the defendant knowingly 
waived his right against self-incrimination when he exercised his right to allocution at 
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sentencing. As outlined above, Maestas did not knowingly waive his right against self-
incrimination when he exercised his right to defend himself and allocute at sentencing 
since he did not know that the conviction was flawed or that the statements would be used 
against him if his conviction were successfully appealed. Because of the simplistic 
approach employed by the majority, the possible penalty which exists in Utah if a 
defendant does not take responsibility at sentencing, and the failure to consider whether 
the defendant knowingly waived the privilege against self-incrimination, the majority 
decision in Harvey does not support the trial judge's ruling in this case. 
The majority decision in Harvey is likewise not compelling because the issue arose 
in a different procedural context than the current case, in a state with different protections. 
First, the issue arose at a trial on new charges rather than at retrial after the defendant 
prevailed on appeal. The defendant's right to appeal was therefore not as directly 
impacted in Harvey as it was in this case where the ruling effectively eviscerated that 
right. Second, the applicable Wyoming rule of procedure requires the judge to ask the 
defendant if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf; this contrasts with the Utah 
rule which mandates that the sentencing judge "shall afford the defendant an opportunity 
to make a statement.1' Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Finally, Wyoming does not appear to be a 
state like Utah where a sentencing judge is allowed to consider whether the defendant 
confessed to the crimes in assessing the harshness of the punishment. 
Justice Urbigkit's dissent in Harvey provides a better framework for assessing 
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whether the use of Maestas' allocution statements violates the privilege against self-
incrimination in this case. See Harvey, 835 P.2d at 1084-1104 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). 
As Justice Urbigkit recognized, the majority opinion in Harvey creates a trap for 
defendants which undermines the right to appeal as well as the right to allocution. Id at 
1084 (Urbigkit, J, dissenting). Justice Urbigkit's analysis demonstrates that Maestas' 
exercise of his right to allocution did not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
right against self-incrimination at any future trial if the case were reversed on appeal. See 
14 at 1084-1104 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). 
Justice Golden also dissented, indicating that he would reverse Harvey's 
conviction based on the use of the allocution statements as evidence in the state's case-in-
chief. Id at 1134-36 (Golden, J., dissenting). As Justice Golden pointed out: 
I can find no fairness in what happened to Mr. Harvey as result of his 
allocution statement. I see only surprise and ambush. The sentencing court 
did not warn him that anything he said in allocution would be used against 
him in a criminal prosecution; in fact, it was only after Mr. Harvey made his 
statement that the sentencing judge informed him of his right to appeal the 
conviction on which, moments before, he had been sentenced. I am unable 
to find that Mr. Harvey made a knowing, intelligent, and informed waiver 
of his right to remain silent. 
Id. at 1136 (Golden, J., dissenting). 
There is likewise no fairness in the use of Maestas' allocution statements at retrial 
after this Court overturned his flawed conviction. Maestas' allocution statements were 
not a voluntary waiver of his right against self-incrimination since, among other things, 
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the trial judge could consider whether Maestas admitted guilt in assessing sentence. The 
allocution statements were not a knowing waiver of the right against self-incrimination 
since, among other things, Maestas did not know the conviction was flawed, was not 
advised of his right to appeal and did not know the statements would be used as retrial if 
his conviction were reversed on appeal. The allocution statements were the fruit of the 
poisonous tree, and any waiver of the right against self-incrimination which occurred was 
limited to a waiver of that right for the purposes of the sentencing hearing. 
The trial court's ruling that Maestas' sentencing statements are admissible at retrial 
creates an unfair trap and ambushes criminal defendants. Maestas respectfully requests 
that it be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Gino Maestas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial judge's rulings and (1) allow Appellant the opportunity to introduce expert 
testimony in support of his identification defense, and (2) preclude the state's use of 
Appellant's statements made as part of the presentence investigation and at sentencing at 
retrial. 
SUBMITTED this *t*JL day of August, 2000. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
^ f 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
—00O00— 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. No. 20000094-SC 
Gino Maestas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Permission to Appeal an 
Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order filed on January 25, 2000 is granted. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
ADDENDUM B 
By ^ ^ K E C O u U y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT "—r-
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GINO MAESTAS, 
Defendant. 
: 
: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 951900917 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the 
State's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony, and on the defendant's 
Motion to Exclude Allocution Statements, the Court now enters the 
following 
ORDER 
1. The defense may not present expert witness testimony of 
Dr. David H. Dodd regarding the acquisition, retention and 
retrieval of information relevant to the human memory process as it 
applies to issues of eyewitness identification. 
2. The State may introduce as evidence in its case-in-chief 
at defendant's retrial statements made in anticipation of and at 
the time of the sentencing which resulted from his conviction at 
the 1995 trial, which was later reversed and remanded by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
C\ 
STATE V. MAESTAS PAGE TWO ORDER 
3. Because the issues addressed in this ruling are 
substantial issues of first impression in Utah, and considering the 
history of the present case, interlocutory review of this ruling is 
warranted and desirable from this Court's point of view. 
Dated this .day of Dogimbei', 1000. 
ROBERff K. HILD' 
DISTRICT COURTxVUDGf^^ I 
ADDENDUM C 
/ 
H U D DISTMCT £0URT 
Th/rd Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD J#0] 
JAN 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
°eputy Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
6INO MAESTAS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON STATE'S 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION 
CASE NO. 951900917 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 
15 day of October, 1999. Present were the State of Utah, by and 
through its counsel, Roger S. Blaylock, the defendant and his 
counsel, Scott Williams. Evidence having been taken, Memoranda 
having been submitted, arguments having been made and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 20, 1995, a Top Stop located at 488 East 100 
South, and a Pizza Hut restaurant located 787 N. Redwood Road, were 
robbed by a Hispanic male with a handgun, or a facsimile thereof. 
2. One eyewitness observed the robber and testified about 
his identity in the robbery at the Top Stop after identifying the 
defendant as the robber at a show-up, a lineup, a preliminary 
hearing, and at the trial. 
STATE V. MAESTAS PAGE TWO FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
3. Six eyewitnesses observed the robber and testified about 
his identity in the robbery of the Pizza Hut with two of them 
identifying the defendant at a show-up, four of them identifying 
the defendant at a lineup as the robber or one of two or three 
persons who could be the robber, two of them identifying the 
defendant as the robber at a preliminary hearing and four of them 
identifying the defendant as the robber at the trial, 
4. No instruction was given during the first trial relating 
to concerns about or to conditions affecting the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification. 
5. The conviction of the defendant on eight counts of 
Aggravated Robbery was overturned because "counsels failure to 
request a cautionary eyewitness instruction rendered his 
performance constitutionally deficient" and required a new trial • 
6. This Court has conducted a "Ramirez" hearing at which it 
reviewed testimony of seven eyewitnesses to evaluate the 
admissibility of their identifications of the defendant in light of 
circumstances surrounding each victim fs identification of the 
defendant. 
7. This Court in performing its gate keeping function 
relating to eyewitness identification has issued a ruling excluding 
the identification of three witnesses, Leslie Kurys, Kara Hsiao and 
STATE V. MAESTAS PAGE THREE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Candace Hsiao, based on circumstances surrounding each victimfs 
identification. 
8. This Court is prepared, upon request from defendant 
through counsel, to present the jury with thorough instructions on 
the concerns about and factors affecting accuracy of eyewitness 
identification as set forth in the Long case, 
9. The eyewitness identification expert the defendant 
proposed to call, Dr. Dodd, would testify generally about the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification and specifically about 
the unreliability of individual victim1 s testimony relating to 
their identification of the defendant as the robber of the Top Stop 
and the robber of persons at the Pizza Hut. 
10. The general factors and concerns relating to eyewitness 
identification that Dr. Dodd would testify about will be addressed 
in the Long instruction given the jury by this Court. 
11. Dr. Dodd's testimony would amount to a lecture to the 
jury relating to the unreliability of eyewitness identification. 
12. The State did not challenge the scientific principles or 
techniques upon which Dr. Dodd's testimony would be based, and the 
scientific reliability of the proposed evidence is not at issue. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, does now enter 
its 
STATE V. MAESTAS PAGE FOUR FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. It is the Court's obligation to educate the jury as to 
the law relating to a specific case. 
2. Educating the jury is not a function to be delegated to 
an expert who would, in fact, merely lecture the jury. 
3. Determining the quality of the evidence is the province 
of the finder of fact, the jury, and not normally the province of 
the Court. 
4. Only in questions of eyewitness identification and in no 
other circumstance does the Court specifically comment to the jury 
on the quality of the evidence. 
5. The Court has or will address defendants eyewitness 
concerns in two ways: first, by way of the Ramirez hearing already 
conducted and, second, by giving a Long eyewitness identification 
instruction, if requested. 
6. Giving the defendant a third means to explore the 
eyewitness identification issue by allowing an expert to testify on 
the unreliability of eyewitness testimony would have a significant 
tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role as a fact finder at 
least with respect to any issues that must be decided based on 
eyewitness testimony. 
STATE V, MAESTAS PAGE FIVE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
7. Defendant will not be allowed to call an expert to 
lecture the jury about the unreliability of eyewitness 
m 
ADDENDUM D 
FILED DISTRICT C0UR1 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 0 5 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNT 
By 
DeputyCierk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
6IN0 MAESTAS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON STATE'S 
MOTION TO ALLOW PRESENTATION 
OF VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS OF 
DEFENDANT DURING STATE'S 
CASE IN CHIEF 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 
15th day of October, 1999. Present were the State of Utah, by and 
through its counsel, Roger S. Blaylock, the defendant and his 
counsel, Scott Williams. Evidence having been taken, Memoranda 
having been submitted, arguments having been made and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 20, 1995, a Top Stop convenience store 
located at 488 East 100 South, and a Pizza Hut restaurant located 
at 787 N. Redwood Road, were robbed by a Hispanic male with a 
handgun or a facsimile thereof. 
2. On June 19 through June 20, 1995, the defendant stood 
trial for an Aggravated Robbery committed at the Top Stop and seven 
Aggravated Robberies committed at the Pizza Hut. 
STATE V. MAESTAS PAGE 2 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
3. On June 19, 1995, the defendant, after taking an oath to 
testify truthfully, took the witness stand and denied any 
involvement in the robberies at the Top Stop and the Pizza Hut on 
February 20, 1995. His testimony included the following: 
Q: (By Mr. Johnston) Mr. Maestas, on 20 February 1995, were 
you at a family party at Mary Sisneros1 home from 
approximately 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: It's been asked and answered 
THE COURT: Overruled 
Q: (By Mr. Johntson) Did you rob the Top Stop on 20 
February, 1995? 
A: No, I didn't. 
Q: Did you rob the Pizza Hut on February 20? 
A: No, I didn't. 
MR. JOHNSTON: Thank you. 
4. Defendant tried to gain an advantage with the jury by 
swearing under oath that he had not robbed the Top Stop or the 
persons at the Pizza Hut restaurant. 
5. On June 20, 1995, the defendant was convicted by a jury 
of eight counts of Aggravated Robbery with sentencing set for July 
21, 1995, pending the preparation of a Presentence Investigation 
Report pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 77-18-1(5). 
STATE V. MAESTAS PAGE 3 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
6. On July 10, 1995, in response to AP&P's request for 
information relevant to preparation of the presentence report the 
defendant wrote out, signed and gave Agent Albert J. Whitehorse a 
statement admitting robbing the Top Stop and persons at the Pizza 
Hut "to get me some money to go get high...I went to the gas 
station first and I then went to the restaurant. I went in the 
restaurant and seen a young man at the counter so I told him to 
give me the money and the rest of the people I told them to lay 
down. I took the money...." 
7. Nothing in the court record suggests that defendant's 
written statement dated July 10, 1995 was not voluntary. 
8. At the sentencing on July 21, 1995, counsel for defendant 
stated to the Court and to all present, "He has indicated to the 
probation officer that, in fact, he did commit the crimes that he 
has been convicted of, and he is extremely sorry for the impact 
that it has had on the victims, on the community, and upon his 
family...." 
9. On July 21, 1995, the defendant stated to the Court and 
to all present, "I had admitted to the robberies that I done, I do 
have remorse for the victims, you know, and I regret doing what I 
did...I committed robbery before. I done time in prison. I got 
caught up in drugs, which I have never had any offense for, and I 
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got caught up in them, and I committed these robberies...1 would 
like some leniency from the court on that •• 
10. Defendant's statement made in open court July 21, 1995, 
was voluntary and nothing in the court record suggests that the 
statement was the result of any coercion by the police, the State 
or the Court. . 
11. Defendant tired to obtain leniency from the sentencing 
judge, the Honorable Pat Brian, by admitting in open court that he 
had in fact robbed the Top Stop, that he had in fact robbed the 
persons at the Pizza Hut restaurant and that he had "remorse for 
the victims." 
12. There is no evidence that either the Court or the State 
promised defendant a more favorable sentence if he confessed and 
came clean. 
13. Defendant was granted a new trial because "trial 
counsel's failure to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction 
rendered his performance constitutionally deficient and prejudiced 
Maestas" and not because of any action by the prosecution during 
the trial. 
14. Defendant's admissions were analogous to voluntary 
confessions given to a third party following trial. 
15. There is no evidence that defendant had ever been 
informed prior to his sentencing of his right to appeal his 
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conviction, of his right to remain silent at sentencing, or that 
any statements he made in anticipation of or at the time of 
sentencing might be usable against him at any later proceeding on 
this case. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact does now enter 
its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Allocution, the right to speak directly to a court prior 
to sentencing, was originally granted defendants because they were 
not represented by counsel and had no other opportunity to argue 
for leniency. 
2. Utah Code Ann., Section 77-18-1(7), provides a defendant 
a right of allocution stating that "At the time of sentence, the 
court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning 
the appropriate sentence....11 
3. Defendant's right to allocution is not a constitutional 
right spelled out in the U.S. Constitution or the Utah Constitution 
and is not on the same level as defendant's Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. 
4. Defendant's admissions in writing and in open court were 
voluntary and not obtained through government coercion or 
misconduct, therefore, even if the "fruit of the poisoned tree" 
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doctrine would otherwise apply, that doctrine has no bearing on 
this case, 
5. Defendants statements were analogous to voluntary 
confessions made to third parties following trial and therefore do 
not implicate the Fifth Amendment. 
6. Rule 24(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does 
not require the exclusion of new evidence which comes to light 
after a defendant is granted a new trial. 
7. A defendants admissions to probation officers, relatives 
or other third parties constitute new evidence admissible at a 
defendants retrial. 
8. There was no constitutional violation as defendant was 
not required to give up one constitutional right to protect another 
constitutional right to exercise his right to allocution. 
9. To the extent the Fifth Amendment may be implicated, 
defendant initially waived his right to remain silent when he took 
the stand, swore an oath to tell the truth and testified at the 
trial. He further waived that right, if it applied, when he 
voluntarily exercised his right to allocution at sentencing. 
10. There is no constitutional or statutory reason or case 
precedent to exclude defendant's admissions as they are relevant 
evidence a jury is entitled to hear. 
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11 • After establishing the appropriate foundation, the 
prosecution will be allowed to use defendant's admissions in the 
prosecution's case in chief. 
Dated this .day of Beeember, 1091D /Q mi^m 
DISTRICT COURT 
ADDENDUM E 
77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. 
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing 
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when 
available. 
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom 
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the 
name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. 
If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other 
party. 
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does 
not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony, or in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party 
intending to call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation 
of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the 
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed 
by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available. 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of 
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of 
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by 
the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary 
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's 
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at 
which the expert may be called as an expert witness. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
(5)(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. ~ 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ADDENDUM F 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Gino MAESTAS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 970298. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 9, 1999. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Pat B. 
Brian, J., of eight counts of aggravated rob-
bery, and defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel, 
and (2) defense counsel's omissions preju-
diced defendant entitling him to new trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law ©=>1134(3) 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel on direct appeal, are re-
viewed as a matter of law. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law <3=>641.13(2.1) 
Defense counsel's failure to request cau-
tionary instruction regarding eyewitness tes-
timony at aggravated robbery trial amounted 
to ineffective assistance of counsel, where 
there was question about the reliability of 
eyewitness identification of defendant as rob-
ber; show-up identification occurred at night, 
defendant was handcuffed and surrounded by 
police cars with their lights shining on him, 
none of the witnesses ever saw the full face 
of robber, and most of the witnesses had 
limited opportunity to observe robber. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
3. Criminal Law c=>1166.10(l) 
Defense counsel's failure to request cau-
tionary instruction regarding eyewitness tes-
timony at aggravated robbery trial preju-
diced defendant requiring reversal, where 
instruction would have highlighted weak-
nesses in identifications of defendant as rob-
ber and circumstantial evidence against de-
fendant was weak. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
6. 
Jan Graham, Att'y. Gen., Kenneth A. 
Bronston, Asst. Att'y. Gen., Roger S. Blay-
lock, Deputy District Att'y, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender, 
for Appellant 
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice: 
111 Gino Maestas appeals from convic-
tions on eight counts of aggravated robbery. 
Maestas asserts that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, because his trial counsel failed 
to (1) request a cautionary eyewitness identi-
fication instruction, (2) move to suppress the 
allegedly unreliable eyewitness identifica-
tions, (3) move to sever charges stemming 
from robberies at two different locations, (4) 
request a jury instruction limiting the use of 
double hearsay, and (5) move to consolidate 
two robbery counts based on the taking of 
property from one individual. Maestas ar-
gues that the above omissions entitle him to 
a new trial. 
U 2 On February 2, 1995, a lone assailant 
robbed a Top Stop convenience store located 
at 488 East 100 South, and a Pizza Hut 
restaurant located at 787 North Redwood 
Road, within a period of one hour. Accord-
ing to the testimony at trial, a man entered 
the Top Stop just after 8:00 p.m., wearing a 
mask, a baseball cap, and a two-tone blue 
coat. The man walked to the counter, pulled 
out a gun, and demanded that the clerk, Paul 
Harbrecht, give him the money from the 
cash register. The robber also demanded 
that Harbrecht give up his wallet.1 Har-
brecht complied, placing all the money from 
the cash register, approximately thirty-five 
dollars, and six dollars from his own wallet 
into a small off-white backpack that the rob-
ber placed on the counter. The robber al-
lowed Harbrecht to keep his wallet and his 
identification. The robbery lasted approxi-
mately two minutes. 
STATE v. 
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113 Harbrecht testified at trial that he 
pushed the store's "panic button" to alert 
police to the robbery, then ran outside to 
watch the robber flee. The robber jogged 
down the street for approximately half a 
block, then got into a gold-colored mid-80's 
Camaro. Harbrecht stated that he was not 
afraid during the robbery because he had 
been robbed only four months earlier. He 
concentrated on the robber's exposed fea-
tures—his eyes, eyebrows, and nose. Officer 
Rose Marie Jones responded to the robbery 
call. Harbrecht described the robber as a 
Hispanic male in his twenties, between 57" 
and 5'9" inches tall, with short dark hair and 
dark eyes. He stated that the robber was 
wearing a white hat, blue Levis, and a two-
tone blue coat. Although the lighting outside 
was poor, Harbrecht opined that the robber 
escaped in a gold-colored Camaro. 
114 While Officer Jones was filling out 
the robbery report, she and Harbrecht heard 
another robbery being reported over her po-
lice radio involving a perpetrator with a de-
scription similar to the Top Stop robber. 
Officer Jones responded to that call. As she 
left, she told Harbrecht that she might re-
turn to pick him up so he could identify the 
suspect. Later, Officer Jones did just that, 
stating, "they had caught a suspect and [she] 
wanted [Harbrecht] to identify him." She 
drove Harbrecht to where other officers had 
stopped Maestas. Maestas was surrounded 
by police officers, wearing handcuffs, and 
standing with a spotlight and headlights di-
rected towards him. Harbrecht identified 
Maestas as the individual who had robbed 
the Top Stop a short time earlier. 
11 5 The second robbery (which accounts 
for seven of the eight counts of aggravated 
robbery) occurred at a Pizza Hut restaurant 
on Redwood Road at approximately 8:55 p.m. 
The robber wore Levis, a bluish-green and 
gray jacket, brown hiking boots and a hat; a 
dark mask covered his head and the lower 
part of his face. The robber entered the 
restaurant and pulled out a gun. The robber 
approached Pizza Hut employee Kurt 
Anderson, pushed the gun against 
Anderson's chest, and demanded that he 
place the money from the cash register into a 
bag. Anderson was scared, and his "life 
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flashed before [his] eyes." Anderson gave 
the bag to the Pizza Hut manager Jesse 
Baldwin and told him they were being 
robbed. The robber then ordered Anderson 
to the floor. From the floor, Anderson could 
no longer observe the robber or his interac-
tions with the restaurant patrons. He did, 
however, hear the robber demand, in a Span-
ish accent, the money from the cash register 
and the safe, and from the other restaurant 
patrons. Anderson later described the rob-
ber as wearing a bluish-green and gray jack-
et and hiking boots and walking with a 
"limp." 
11 6 With Anderson on the floor, Baldwin 
complied with the robber's request, placing 
approximately $170 from the cash register, 
including $10 in loose change, into the bag. 
During the delay, while the safe's timing 
cycle was operating, the robber collected 
money from the store employees and two 
restaurant customers. Anderson gave the 
robber six dollars from his wallet and Bald-
win gave him between $15 and $20. The 
robber allowed both Anderson and Baldwin 
to keep their wallets. 
117 Baldwin observed the robber for a 
total of approximately four minutes, some-
times from as far away as forty feet. Bald-
win described the robber as in his twenties 
weighing 180 pounds, with dark brown eyes, 
thick eyebrows, and a wrinkled forehead. 
He stated that the robber spoke with an 
accent, walked with a distinctive gait, and 
had an "odd" posture. According to Bald-
win, the robber wore a black mask which 
extended all around his head, a white base-
ball cap, a "green, greenish-gray, greenish 
blue" coat, and navy-blue or black pants. 
118 Shortly after the robbery, Officer 
Richard Findlay took Anderson and Baldwin 
to view a possible suspect located about a 
block from the restaurant. Maestas was 
handcuffed and standing in a spotlight be-
tween several patrol cars with their emer-
gency lights activated. Anderson and Bald-
win discussed the similarities and differences 
between Maestas and the robber. Baldwin 
thought the eyes were the same as the rob-
ber's. Anderson thought Maestas wore the 
same shoes. Both Anderson and Baldwin 
identified the jacket taken from Maestas' car 
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as the one worn by the robber. Although 
initiaUy unsure, after viewing the jacket, both 
identified Maestas as the robber. 
II9 Candace Hsiao and her daughter 
Kara were customers in the Pizza Hut during 
the robbery. They testified that while they 
were eating and talking, a Hispanic male 
wearing a black muffler over his head and 
face approached, pointed a gun at them, and 
asked for their purses. Candace and Kara 
were terrified. Candace "blocked out" ev-
erything except the gun. Candace gave the 
robber $15 in cash and bills and the money 
pouch in her day planner. Kara gave him 
five crumpled dollar bills. 
H 10 Kara described the robber as wear-
ing a white sweatshirt and hiking boots. Ac-
cording to Kara, the robber was polite and 
spoke with a slight accent. Later, at the 
show-up, neither Candace nor Kara could 
positively identify Maestas as the robber.1 
1^11 Pizza Hut employees Shelby and 
Leslie Kurys were cleaning their work sta-
tions when Shelby saw the robber with a gun 
pointed at Anderson's back. The robber or-
dered Shelby and Leslie to the ground and 
asked for their wallets and wedding rings. 
The couple refused to give up their rings and 
did not have wallets. They did not see much 
because they remained on the floor until the 
robber left. However, they noted that the 
robber had a black mask, thick eyebrows and 
brown or hazel eyes. Both Shelby and Les-
lie described the robber as having a distinc-
tive gait. 
112 At the line-up, after viewing Maestas 
at the show-up, Harbrecht, Anderson, and 
Baldwin all identified Maestas as the robber. 
Candace and Kara Hsiao did not choose 
Maestas from the line-up, although they did 
identify him as a possibility. Leslie and 
Shelby Kurys both chose individuals other 
than Maestas from the lineup. 
1113 At trial, Harbrecht, Baldwin, and 
Anderson, all of whom had viewed Maestas 
at the show-up, identified Maestas as the 
robber. Kara and Candace Hsiao, who also 
1. The record is unclear regarding whether Can-
dace or Leslie and Shelby Kurys were at the 
show-up Officer Cole testified at trial that he 
had Officer Fmdlay transport the Pizza Hut vic-
tims to the show-up. Officer Cole further testi-
had seen Maestas at the show-up but could 
not pick him out of a line-up, testified that 
they thought, but were not sure, that Maes-
tas was the person who robbed them. Leslie 
and Shelby Kurys, after choosing different 
individuals from the line-up, identified Maes-
tas as the robber at trial. There were simi-
lar inconsistencies at trial in the testimony 
identifying the coat recovered by police from 
Maestas' car as that worn by the robber. 
Some witnesses recognized it, others did not. 
1114 At trial, in addition to the eyewit-
ness accounts described above, the following 
evidence was offered: Officer Donald Cole 
testified that shortly after the Pizza Hut 
robbery he received a description of the sus-
pect: "male Hispanic, dark hair, dark eyes, 
wearing a . . . blue and green jacket." An 
updated description included the fact that the 
suspect might be driving a blue late 70's 
Camaro. [id] Approximately 3 ^ blocks from 
the Pizza Hut, Officer Cole observed a blue 
Camaro parked in an apartment driveway. 
The hood felt warm, indicating that the car 
had recently been driven. From outside the 
car, Officer Cole observed crumpled dollar 
bills on the passenger seat and a blue and 
green jacket in the backseat. 
1115 Officer Cole then saw two people 
exit the apartment and get into the Camaro 
and drive off. Officer Cole stopped the car a 
few blocks away. Between five and seven 
other officers assisted him in the stop. 
Maestas was driving the Camaro; Mary 
Sisneros was the passenger. About $53 was 
recovered from the Camaro and officers 
found a blue and green jacket in the back 
seat. According to Officer Cole at trial, "all" 
the robbery victims positively identified 
Maestas as the robber and "all" recognized 
the jacket as the one worn by the robber. 
f 16 Officer Cole transported Maestas to 
the police department, while other officers 
conducted a search of Sisneros' apartment. 
The search located a dark neck gator, a head 
band, and a hat. No money or clothing 
matching the robber's was found. 
fied that all the Pizza Hut victims positively iden-
tified Maestas as the robber at the show-up 
Thus, although not specifically mentioned in the 
record, a reasonable inference is that all the 
victims participated in the show-up. 
STATE v. 
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1117 Maestas testified in his own defense 
that on the evening of the robberies, he went 
to a family party at Sisneros' residence. He 
claimed he arrived at the apartment at ap-
proximately 5:30 p.m. and remained there 
until about 9:00 p.m. During that time, Maes-
tas testified, he helped Sisneros clean up 
from dinner and watched some television. 
He claimed he did not leave the apartment at 
all during the evening until the time of his 
arrest. Maestas also pointed out that, in 
contrast to the descriptions offered by the 
eyewitnesses: (1) at the time of the robbery, 
he weighed only 135-40 pounds, not 180; (2) 
he had green, not brown, eyes; (3) he did not 
speak with an accent; and (4) he did not walk 
with a limp or a distinctive gait. Further-
more, Maestas testified that he was wearing 
sweat pants and a hooded sweatshirt at the 
time of his arrest, not the clothing described 
by the robbery victims, and that he had not 
changed his clothes that evening. 
1118 Sisneros corroborated Maestas' tes-
timony, confirming that he was at her home 
from approximately 5:30 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., 
that he helped her clean up after dinner, 
watched television, drank some beer, and 
that he did not leave during that interval. 
1119 On rebuttal, Detective Dalling testi-
fied that Sisneros told him that she had 
spent a considerable amount of time that 
evening cleaning other parts of the apart-
ment and, therefore, she would not necessari-
ly have known if Maestas had left the apart-
ment. Detective Dalling also testified that, 
during the search, he found food throughout 
the kitchen, giving it the appearance that it 
had not been cleaned. Sisneros claimed at 
the trial that she did not remember telling 
the above to Dalling. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] 1120 Because new counsel repre-
sents Maestas in this appeal and because we 
believe the record is adequate to review his 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal, we will review those claims as 
a matter of law. See State v. Chacon, 962 
P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To establish that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Maestas must show that his counsel "ren-
dered deficient performance which fell below 
MAESTAS Utah 379 
376 (Utah 1999) 
an objective standard of reasonable profes-
sional judgment" and that ''counsel's defi-
cient performance prejudiced him." Id. To 
do this, Maestas must "identify specific acts 
or omissions that fell outside the wide range 
of professional assistance and illustrate that, 
absent those acts or omissions, there is a 
'reasonable probability' of a more favorable 
result." Id. (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994)). To determine 
whether there is a reasonable probability of a 
more favorable outcome, we consider uthe 
totality of the evidence taking into account 
such factors as whether the errors affect the 
entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated 
effect and how strongly the verdict is sup-
ported by the record." State v. Hovater, 914 
P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah 1996). Finally, in re-
viewing counsel's performance, we give trial 
counsel wide latitude in making tactical deci-
sions and not question those tactical deci-
sions unless there is no reasonable basis 
supporting them. See Taylor i\ Warden, 905 
P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). 
11 21 Maestas asserts that he received in-
effective assistance of counsel because his 
trial counsel failed to seek suppression of the 
blatantly suggestive eyewitness identifica-
tions and because counsel failed to request a 
cautionary eyewitness instruction at trial, 
which would have informed the jury of the 
weaknesses inherent in such identifications. 
Maestas argues that the case against him 
turned on the eyewitnesb identification; thus, 
had the jury received an appropriate instruc-
tion, it is probable that they would have 
returned a more favorable verdict. Alterna-
tively, Maestas suggests that had trial coun-
sel moved to suppress the eyewitness identi-
fications made by the robbery victims at the 
show-up, the trial court would have granted 
that request with respect to at least some of 
the eyewitnesses, thus reducing the number 
of eyewitnesses identifying him at trial and 
significantly diluting the strength of the 
State's case against him. 
II. FAILURE TO REQUEST CAUTION-
ARY EYEWITNESS INSTRUCTION 
1122 Maestas asserts that trial counsel 
performed deficiently by failing to request a 
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cautionary instruction regarding the eyewit-
ness testimony. 
[2] 1123 The original identification in 
this case occurred at night with Maestas 
handcuffed and surrounded by police cars 
with their lights shining on him. The offi-
cers told the eyewitnesses that they had 
caught a suspect. Additionally, Harbrecht 
heard a report over the radio that the sus-
pect was involved in another robbery, in-
creasing the likelihood that he would believe 
Maestas also committed the robbery to which 
he was a witness. Furthermore, the sugges-
tive nature of the show-up in this case is 
compounded by the fact that none of the 
witnesses ever saw the full face of the rob-
ber. All the witnesses testified that in both 
the Top Stop and Pizza Hut robberies the 
robber wore a mask covering his nose and 
mouth, and a cap covering his head. 
H 24 There are additional factors that call 
into question the plausibility of the individual 
eyewitness identifications in this case. Most 
of the witnesses had limited opportunity to 
observe the robber. Many were frightened. 
Baldwin and Anderson discussed Maestas' 
similarities to and differences from the rob-
ber at the show-up, suggesting that either 
Baldwin's or Anderson's degree of certainty 
that Maestas was the robber was bolstered 
by comments made by the other. The de-
scriptions given by the eyewitnesses also var-
ied widely. The robber was described by 
different witnesses as having wrinkles, 
weighing 180 pounds, having a limp, having 
no limp, speaking with an accent or no ac-
cent, having brown eyes or green. The wit-
nesses also disagreed about the clothing the 
robber wore. Some claimed the jacket found 
by police in Maestas' car was the one worn 
by the robber; others were unable to identify 
it. Some could identify the hat confiscated 
from Sisneros' apartment; others could not. 
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, only 
three of the seven eyewitnesses could posi-
tively identify Maestas in a line-up when 
asked to choose among him and six other 
Hispanic males. 
1125 The only defense available to Maes-
tas at trial was the unreliability of the eye-
witness identifications. Our cases have sum-
marized the empirical studies questioning the 
reliability of eyewitness identification. See 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 
1991); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 
(Utah 1986). "The studies all lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that human perception is 
inexact and that human memory is both lim-
ited and fallible." Long, 721 P.2d at 488. 
U26 In Long we concluded that, if re-
quested, a trial court must give a cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction in every 
case where identification is a central issue. 
See id. at 492. Our conclusion was based on 
research showing that juries have a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications. We noted that 
because jurors do not appreciate the fallibili-
ty of such identifications, they often give 
eyewitness testimony undue weight. See id. 
at 490. 
1127 Although research has convincingly 
demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in 
eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the 
most part, unaware of these problems. Peo-
ple simply do not accurately understand the 
deleterious effects that certain variables can 
have on the accuracy of the memory process 
of an honest eyewitness. Moreover, the com-
mon knowledge that people do possess often 
runs contrary to documented research find-
ings. See id. at 490. 
U28 Our decision in Long leads to the 
conclusion that, unless obvious tactical rea-
sons exist to forego an instruction, trial coun-
sel faced with seven eyewitnesses who, with 
varying degrees of certainty and consistency, 
all identify his client as the perpetrator, 
should request a cautionary eyewitness in-
struction. Such an instruction would, as 
pointed out in Long, apprise the jury of the 
inherent limitations in eyewitness identifica-
tion. See Long, 721 P.2d at 492. 
H29 The State asserts that competent 
counsel may have reasonably refrained from 
requesting a cautionary instruction because 
the instruction would "bolster" the stronger 
eyewitness identifications, making the jury 
more likely to convict Maestas. See id. at 
492 n. 5. The State's argument is unpersua-
sive. First, none of the identifications in this 
case were impervious to attack under the 
criteria set forth in Long. All of the wit-
STATE v. 
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nesses had a limited opportunity to observe 
the robber; the robberies were completed 
quickly and the robber's face and head were 
covered. Additionally, at least some of the 
witnesses were making a cross-racial identifi-
cation. Some of the witnesses testified to 
being very afraid or fixating on the weapon 
rather than on the robber. Furthermore, as 
set forth above, most, if not all, the wit-
nesses' identifications were tainted by a 
highly suggestive show-up prior to the line-
up in which they selected him. 
1130 Trial counsel did nothing to focus 
the jury's attention on the limitations of eye-
witness identification. He did not educate 
the jury with respect to the factors set forth 
in Long, which affect eyewitness identifica-
tion, nor did he argue how each of those 
factors could have affected particular eyewit-
nesses. Counsel did not present expert testi-
mony regarding the unreliability of eyewit-
ness identification. In sum, the record is 
devoid of evidence or argument that would 
adequately inform the jury regarding the 
problems inherent in eyewitness identifica-
tions. 
1131 Furthermore, in addition to failing 
to request a cautionary instruction, defense 
counsel did not object to Detective Dallings' 
inaccurate testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification. Detective Dalling explained 
the discrepancies in the eyewitnesses" de-
scriptions of the robber by testifying without 
foundation that it is possible to identify a 
person when a witness sees the person, but 
to be unable to describe the person accurate-
ly. Defense counsel did not cross examine 
Detective Dalling regarding this statement, 
or in any way attempt to correct the impres-
sion of the reliable nature of eyewitness iden-
tification that the detective's testimony pre-
sented. 
1132 In sum, under the facts of this case, 
trial counsel rendered objectively deficient 
performance by failing to request a caution-
ary eyewitness identification instruction that 
would have informed the jury of the unrelia-
bility of eyewitness identifications.2 The rec-
2. We do not wish to impK that in every case in 
which evewitness identification is an issue, trial 
counsel s performance is per se deficient if a 
cautionary instruction is not requested The 
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ord does not reveal any reasonable tactic that 
would ameliorate or explain that deficiency. 
III. PREJUDICE 
1133 The State asserts that even if we 
find that Maestas' trial counsel rendered ob-
jectively deficient performance in failing to 
request a cautionary eyewitness instruction, 
Maestas was not prejudiced by that failure. 
The State claims that any error was harm-
less because there was an "abundance" of 
evidence supporting Maestas' conviction. 
[3] U 34 We conclude, however, that the 
absence of a cautionary instruction seriously 
undermined the fairness of this trial. See 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 
1993). Counsel's omission went to the heart 
of the defense—the theory that Maestas was 
mistakenly identified as the robber. An ap-
propriate jury instruction would have high-
lighted the weaknesses in the remaining 
identifications for the jury, which might well 
have changed the verdict. 
11 35 We do not find the other evidence 
supporting the conviction conclusive. Har-
brecht observed the robber getting into a 
Camaro—the same make of automobile driv-
en by Maestas at the time of his arrest. Hot 
air and a warm hood indicated that the Ca-
maro had recently been driven, contrary to 
Maestas' testimony that he remained at 
Sisneros' apartment all evening. Officer 
Cole recovered "several" crumpled dollar 
bills from the front seat of Maestas' Cama-
ro—the robber took (exactly) five crumpled 
dollar bills from Kara Hsiao during the Pizza 
Hut robbery. Some of the witnesses identi-
fied the coat found in Maestas' car as the one 
worn by the robber. A search of Sisneros' 
apartment revealed a dark neck gator capa-
ble of being used as a mask and a hat that 
some of the eyewitnesses claimed the robber 
wore. 
1136 The foregoing circumstantial evi-
dence is inconclusive when viewed in light of 
what the officers did not find. Each eyewit-
ness testified that the robber used a gun. 
No gun was found. The Pizza Hut employ-
ees indicated that the robber stole at least 
facts in another case might provide a plausible 
justification for such a tactic The record in this 
case, however, does not 
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$15 in loose change. No change was found 
on Maestas or Sisneros, in his car, or in 
Sisneros' apartment. Only $53 was recov-
ered from Sisneros and/or from Maestas' car, 
whereas over $200 was taken in the robber-
ies. No money was found in the apartment. 
The officers also did not find the bags used 
in the robberies or the day planner pouch 
stolen from Candace Hsiao. Maestas was 
not wearing clothing consistent with the de-
scriptions of the robber at the time of his 
arrest, nor did the searches of Maestas' car 
and Sisneros' apartment locate such clothing. 
Maestas' car, although the same make as the 
one used in the Top Stop robbery, was a low-
rider with chrome wheels; it did not match 
the description of the car seen leaving the 
Top Stop as to year and color. On balance, 
we find that the circumstantial evidence 
against Maestas is not overwhelming or con-
clusive. Thus, absent defense counsel's defi-
cient performance, there is a reasonable like-
lihood that a more favorable result would 
have been reached. 
1137 We hold that trial counsel's failure to 
request a cautionary eyewitness instruction 
rendered his performance constitutionally de-
ficient and prejudiced Maestas. Maestas is 
entitled to a new trial. Reversed and re-
manded. 
Chief Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART, 
Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice 
RUSSON concur in Associate Chief Justice 
DURHAM'S opmion. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Douglas A. LOVELL, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 930439. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 23, 1999. 
Rehearing Denied June 22, 1999. 
Defendant pled guilty to the aggravated 
murder and waived his right to be sentenced 
by a jury. The District Court, Weber County, 
Stanton M. Taylor, J., sentenced defendant 
to death, and defendant appealed. After re-
mand for trial court to conduct evidentiary 
hearing on conflict of interest with defense 
counsel, the Supreme Court, Durham, Asso-
ciate C.J., held that: (1) lengthy personal and 
business relationship between defense coun-
sel and prosecutor did not result in actual 
conflict of interest; (2) failure to inquire into 
defendant's letter, regarding dissatisfaction 
with counsel or possible self-representation, 
was harmless; (3) relying on same facts for 
two aggravators was harmless beyond rea-
sonable doubt; and (4) counsel was not inef-
fective in failing to challenge constitutionality 
of death penalty statute. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <£=>641.5(.5) 
The right to conflict-free representation 
is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3), 1158(1) 
Supreme Court defers to the trial court's 
findings of fact following remand for eviden-
tiary hearing on claim of conflict of interest 
with counsel, but treats issue as a question of 
law. Rules App.Proc, Rule 23B. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>641.5(.5) 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel was not violat-
ed by lengthy personal and business relation-
ship between defense counsel and prosecutor, 
who jointly owned real estate and who had 
practiced together, absent any showing of 
actual conflict that adversely affected defen-
dant, either in general manner of approach-
ing case or seeking plea bargain to avoid 
death penalty. U.S.C A ConstAmend. 6. 
4. Criminal Law <s=»641.5(.5) 
Actual conflict of interest, not mere ap-
pearance of impropriety, is required to show 
ineffective assistance of counsel. U.S.CA 
Const .Amend. 6. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE 
EXPERT WITNESS 
Plaintiff, : 
GINOMAESTAS, : Case No. 951900917FS 
JUDGE: HILDER 
Defendant. : 
Defendant, Gino, by and through his attorney of record, Scott C. Williams, 
hereby provides notice pursuant to 77-17-13 U.C.A. of his intent to call Dr. David H. as an 
expert witness at trial in the above captioned matter if the defendant does not prevail in his 
Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification. 
Dr. Dodd is a professor of Psychology at the University of Utah and specializes in 
Eyewitness Memory, Cognition and Language, and Language Development. In this case, the 
defense will call him to testify relevant to eyewitness identification evidence, and particularly the 
unreliability of such evidence. Dr. Dodd would be expected to inform the jury of the general 
pitfalls and dangers of misidentification evidenced in the large body of empirical studies that 
have been conducted over the past 40 to 50 years. Additionally, Dr. Dodd will relate particular 
studies and concerns to the circumstances surrounding the identification of the defendant by the 
witness(es) in this case, and give his conclusions relevant to the reliability of the identification 
procedure employed in this case. 
The defense cannot afford to employ Dr. Dodd before the outcome of the Motion to 
Suppress. If defendant does not prevail in that Motion, Dr. Dodd will be immediately retained, 
will review the case in detail, and will issue a report which will be immediately forwarded to the 
prosecution. Attached hereto is a copy of Dr. Dodd's most recent curriculum vitae. 
This Notice is sufficient to satisfy the preliminary requirements of 77-17-13. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ 2 _ day of September, 1999. 
OTT C. WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing , 
postage prepaid, this Y day ow^n^5^Tto Roger Blaylock, Assistant Salt Lake District 
Attorney, located at 2001 South State, S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-1210. 
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SCOTT C. WILLIAMS (6687) 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF 
DEFENSE EXPERT Dr. DAVID DODD 
Plaintiff, : and RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
v. : USE OF EXPERT 
GINO MAESTAS, : Case No. 951900917FS 
JUDGE: HILDER 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW defendant, Gino Maestas, by and through his attorney of record, 
Scott C. Williams, hereby provides the attached supplementary report of defense expert witness 
Dr. David H. Dodd relating the specific nature of his proposed testimony in the above captioned 
matter. 
It should be noted that Dr. Dodd's testimony would not only describe the various general 
issues and pitfalls besetting eyewitness identification testimony, but would also include specific 
analogies between the facts of this case and the circumstances and settings of specific studies of 
which he has knowledge. Thus, Dr. Dodd will not simply be "lecturing to the jury" on the 
subject of purely generalized issues and concerns related to eyewitness identification. He will, 
instead, be providing testimony that is essential to the need on the part of the defense to fully 
explain and demonstrate both the general problems, and the particular problems as they are 
manifested in the specific facts of this case and the circumstances of the identification of the 
defendant by various witnesses. 
Dr. Dodd's expert testimony is the only means by which the defendant's theory of the 
case can be fully and adequately presented. Absent expert testimony and the inclusion by 
reference of the many particular studies that confirm the existence of serious pitfalls in 
eyewitness identification, the defense will have only argument to the jury-which the jury will be 
instructed is not evidence. Expert witness testimony is especially important in a case like this 
one in that there is no direct evidence tying the defendant to the crimes, and eyewitness 
identification has been shown to be not only prone to error, such error has been shown to be 
exacerbated by the fact that jurors tend to actually over-emphasize the reliability and credibility 
of eyewitness identification. That is the reason that special instructions are required in cases like 
this one. (See, the opinion reversing and remanding this case on appeal, as well as Long and 
Ramirez.) However, jury instructions alone would be insufficient to safeguard against the pitfalls 
of I.D. testimony, because the jury will have nothing that is actually in evidence to inform the 
issues and give them guidance in applying the instructions to the case. 
In consideration of such circumstances, this Court should allow the defense to call Dr. 
Dodd as an expert witness at trial for the purposes related in this Supplement and the original 
Notice previously filed. 
\*itf RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jj±_ day of October, 1999 
OTT C. WfLLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/oeliverej^a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, this y day of October, 1999, to Roger Blaylock, Assistant Salt Lake District 
Attorney, located at 2001 South State, S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-1210. 
Dr. David HDodd 
Associate Professor 
Department of Psychology 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City UT 84112 
October 13,1999 
Mr. Scott C Williams 
Attorney 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: State v. Maestas 
Dear Mr. Williams: 
What follows is ray preliminary opinion on the Maestas case, formed on the basis of my 
knowledge of the research on eyewitness perception & memory. My knowledge of the case is 
formed entirely by two transcripts entitled "Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Suppress 
Eyewitness Identification (Volume I & D) dated August 30,1999 & September 8, 1999. It would 
be useful at a later date to review all other relevant materials, such-as police reports following the 
robberies,, reports of the lineup (with appropriate photos), etc. Additional information could only 
add to the list of issues that are of concern with the identifications of witnesses. 
To date, I have testified in more than 20 trials in Utah and Colorado; my CV is previously 
provided to youu The expert testimony I have provided focuses on factors particular to a specific 
case that could influence the accuracy of an eyewitness. In the Maestas case the central issue is 
the accuracy of the identification of the perpetrator. In preparation for testimony, I usually review 
police reports, eyewitness transcripts from preliminary hearings, photospreads or pictures of 
lineups, etc. Then I review and consider the research that is most relevant to the particulars of 
the case. In this case, I have followed this process. 
My testimony in relation to this case would probably include the following: 
1. Eyewitness testimony is dependent upon human perception & memory; it is therefore 
potentially unreliable. The human brain is not a videotape machine that can permanently record 
an image that remains unchanged on the tape. Many factors that control the degree of 
unreliability have been studied in the existing research; relevant research reports now number in 
the hundreds. 
2, Eyewitness experts typically divide the process of memory into three broad stages: 
acquisition) retention, and retrieval.1 Acquisition is the stage in which the relevant 
information is encoded through the senses, primarily vision and audition. Retention is the 
holding of memory over time, a process influenced by the simple passage of time and by other 
related events that may alter the original memory. Retrieval is calling up those memories, 
including reporting what is remembered and recognizing whether this is the same face. 
3. Acquisition is the most critical and depends heavily upon many conditions, especially 
opportunity to acquire the information (including distance from the perpetrator and lighting 
conditions), duration or time, attentional processes, emotional state, etc. Reviewing the 
specifics of this case leads me to offer several relevant factors: 
a) Disguises. This is clearly one of the most important factor in this case. In these 
robberies, the robber covered a large part of his face with a "face mask" and concealed the hair 
with a hat; that is very significant for the probability of later identification- The research is quite 
clear that even minor changes can appreciably reduce the likelihood of identification; for example, 
a change as minimal as an initial observation with glasses and later attempted identification 
without glasses will have a decided effect In a research report by Simmonds et al.,2 they noted 
that one of the identification targets was well disguised by a fur hood, that is, later identification 
was very unlikely is conducted without the hood (9%) than with the hood (54%). The robber in 
the present case is greatly more effectively disguised and even less likely to be correctly identified 
since so little of the face was seen. 
Facial perception depends upon the whole face; thus the greater the degree of disruption 
of the entire face the less likely the face can be accurately acquired. Certain features are 
considered to be most easily and rapidly acquired: i) age (young vs. older/lined), ii) fecial shape 
(Jong, oval vs. round, pudgy), and iii) hair (short vs. long). Of these, approximate age may be 
observable in lines around the eyes and/or forehead. The other two features are difficult to 
acquire with the disguise described. And any acquisition of the total face is inconceivable. 
As to the suggested memory of the eyes of the robber & the eyes of Mr. Maestas as 
similar, it can be noted that this is a possibility, though seemingly remote. A fair test of that 
possibility could best come from a lineup (corporal or photographic) in which similar men all wear 
the noted disguise. 
b) Identification based on clothing. As Simmonds et al. (cited above) report, the use of 
clothing also improves identification since such elements provide additional cues. Yet such 
additional cues provide risk of false identification; as Simmonds et aL point out, if the suspect is 
dressed in clothes similar to the perpetrator and others in a lineup are dressed differently, the 
suspect is likely to be selected, whether or not the suspect is the perpetrator. Indeed, it would be 
ideal to conduct a lineup in which all members are dressed in clothes similar to those described. 
The accuracy of the identification of the clothing itself is a difficult purdc as well. Under 
normal daylight conditions with adequate time to observe a piece of clothing, such as the coat at 
lc£ Loftus, E. F. & Doyle, J. M. (1997) Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (Third 
Edition). Charlotcsville, VA: Lexis Law Publishing 
2Simmonds, D. C. V., Poulton, E. C, & Tickner, A. EL (1975) Identifying people in a 
videotape recording made at night. Ergonomics. 18. 607-618. 
issue, identification should be quite accurate. Here the identification accuracy is unclear, though 
some witnesses claim that Mr. Maestas' s coat is not the one worn by the robber. Even for those 
making a claim of identification of the coat, it is unclear whether this was a result of seeing the 
same coat at the crime and then at the showup or that the showup provided a chance to acquire a 
memory for a new, but somewhat similar, coat. 
c) Lighting conditions. Everyone knows that "you can't see in the dark." Nonetheless 
there are aspects that are not common knowledge, at least consciously so. As light levels reduce, 
visual acuity diminishes as does the ability to perceive colors accurately. Both results relate to 
our dual retinal system; daylight vision relies predominantly on the acuity & color capacity of the 
cones in the crater of the retina and night vision relies predominantly on the rods that arc neither 
color perceptive nor show high acuity. As a result, the ability to sec a face to the level of detail 
necessary to "leanT the face accurately enough for later identification is greatly reduced in darker 
conditions. Simmonds et al. (cited above) have shown a severe reduction in accuracy for a 
videotaped recording made at night relative to a comparable recording made in daylight. 
d) Duration of observation. The shorter the period of time to view a face that has not 
been seen before the less likely someone can later identify that face (e.g,, Laughery ct aL3) In 
addition, reports of time elapsed are commonly serious overestimates in typical eyewitness 
situations (cf. Loftus et al.4). In the present case, it seems unlikely that the entire interaction in 
either robbery took place over more than 1 minute total. 
In a research scenario5 quite similar to key elements of the present case, customers 
(assistants of the experimenter) visited small convenience stores and held a somewhat unusual 
interaction with the clerk (checker). For example, in half of the cases, these customers paid for a 
purchase of 80 - 90 cents with nothing but pennies, counting them all out for the clerk; 
subsequently they asked the clerk for directions to a local place. The visit lasted between 3 and 4 
minutes. The original plan for the experiment called for a return 24 hours later with a 
photographic lineup; however during piloting, identification of the clerks from subsequent photo 
lineup was chance, apparently indicating that no one could make a correct identification from 
memory. When the time between the visit and the identification was shortened to two hours, 
accuracy was still only 34% (compared to a chance level of 17%). The duration of opportunity to 
observe was longer than appears to be true of this case. 
c) Attention. Another central consideration is the amount of time during which the 
eyewitness attended to the face. The witnesses generally spent some of their time looking at 
various aspects of the situation, such as their money. During this period of time, their visual 
processing was occupied with these tasks. 
f) Weapon focus. This term refers to a witness's tendency to concentrate his/her attention 
on a weapon, such as a gun or knife; thus the witness is looking at the barrel of a gun rather than 
3Laughery et al. (1971). Recognition of Human Faces: Effects of Target Exposure Time, 
Target Position, Pose Position, and Type of Photograph, J. Applied PsvchoL 55, 477. 
4Loftus et al. (1987). Time Went By So Slowly: Overestimation of Event Duration By 
Males and Females. Applied Cognitive PsvchoL. 3. 
^Brigham et al. (1982). Accuracy of eyewitness identifications in a field setting. J* 
Personality & So. Psychology. 42. 673-81. 
at the face. This phenomenon is well established; see Loftus & Doyle, op cit Indeed research 
monitoring eye movements demonstrates clearly that this is the case. Impairments of memory 
have been found for both those with a weapon pointed at them and for those who are bystanders. 
g) Stress and fear. A traumatic event involving serious threat of harm to a witness has the 
strong likelihood of disrupting normal mental processes, including the encoding of information 
about the events and people involved (see discussion in Loftus & Doyle, op cit)* Note that 
several of the witnesses describe themselves and/or are described by others as extremely 
frightened by the gun that was waved at them in a threatening manner. In general, higher levels of 
stress/fear tend to interfere with mental functioning and have been shown to result in a strong 
concentration on a narrow set of information in the environment, especially on a weapon if one is 
present. 
Retention. Events during the time in which a memory is retained up to the final recall (at the 
time of trial) have the potential for altering the memory. Of greatest concern are events that 
provide witnesses with strong suggestions about what they remember. 
a) Suggestion. Suggestive events often have very powerful influences on the retention of 
information, including memory for faces; a large body of research* shows that suggestion can 
result in changes in "memory." Suggestion takes various forms; any time a witness sees faces (or 
representations of faces), there is a potential for suggestion. The critical consideration forjudging 
whether an identification is a recognition based on a memory and whether it is likely to be a result 
of suggestion involves the circumstances of that identification, in particular whether an 
identification is fairly conducted. A showup has the greatest potential for providing a suggestive 
recognition. Hie showup clearly offers some advantage to police trying to quickly solve a crime 
and arrest a probably guilty suspect. But within the procedure is a great risk that the act of 
presenting the suspect in a way that says to the witness: "This is the person who committed the 
crime" rather than "Is this the person?" Once the witness agrees that this is the person, the 
memory of the suspect shown up will alter the existing memory in a fairly permanent way so that 
the two "memories" are merged. The show up viewing of the suspect is, as here, with better 
lighting, more time to observe, etc. than was the observation at the time of the crime. There is 
now a very large body of research on suggestion effects, including the "contamination of facial 
memory/' (Cf Jenkins & Davies7) by suggestion. 
A very recent paper highlights the dangers of eyewitness identification in questionable 
circumstances.1 In this paper, Wells et al. argue that "...false eyewitness identification is the 
primary cause of the conviction of innocent people." They reviewed the first 40 cases in which a 
previously convicted person was exonerated based on subsequent DNA evidence. In each of the 
*Cf. Loftus & Doyle, op cit., chapters 3 and 4. 
'Jenkins, F. & Davies, G. (1985) Contamination of facial memory through exposure to 
misleading composite pictures. Journal of Applied Psychology. 70. 164-176, 
*Wclls, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe, (1998, in press). Eyewitness 
identification procedures. Law and human behavior. 
cases, the crime was serious and the convicted person had served time in prison, some on death 
row, prior to the exonerating DNA evidence. The cases were not selected in any way other than 
being the first 40 cases in which such evidence was used to clear the conviaed person. In 90% of 
these cases (36 of 40), eyewitness identification evidence was central to the conviction. In their 
recommendations about improved procedures, they discuss Neil v. Biggers, 1972* and Manson v. 
Braithwaite, 197710 in which the U. S. Supreme Court emphasized these criteria: a) opportunity to 
observe, b) degree of attention, c) accuracy of original description, d) level of certainty at the 
identification procedures, e) time between the crime and the identification procedure. (Note that 
these are remarkably like those proposed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ramirez.11) 
Weils et aL show the relevance and, additionally, some limitations of these standards; then they 
proceed to argue for eyewitness procedures that avoid the sorts of suggestion that contributed to 
the false convictions reported in their article. The serious problems presented by showups are 
specifically discussed by Wells et al. 
Beyond the feet of a showup in this case is the peculiarity of using the showup on multiple 
witnesses. Since the showup oners an enormous risk of contamination of the eyewitness 
identification process, there is a serious question as to why several witnesses would be brought to 
participate in the showup. If we assume that the purpose is efficiency of identifying someone to 
be charged, one witness is quite adequate for that purpose. In addition, concerns about the 
suggestive influences of a showup are highlighted if those who later identify the suspect in a 
lineup are all witnesses who participated in the showup and those who later fail to identify the 
suspect are all witnesses who did not participate in the showup. 
An additional suggestive factor presents itself in the Maestas case. Whenever witnesses 
are allowed to collaborate in making an identification, the risk of suggestion is also increased. 
Loftus & Greene12 demonstrated that a witness can be strongly influenced by the opinion of 
others. In the research study, a witness sees a face, then hears a description of the face with an 
erroneous detail, and then attempts a description and/or identification. Indeed, when given the 
misleading detail, 70% of witnesses picked ("recognized") a face with that erroneous feature 
whereas only 13% of those not so misled picked a face with that detail. 
It is also well established that an erroneous "recognition," once made, will be maintained 
in later identifications. Gorenstein & Ellsworth13 found that, once an erroneous choice was made, 
^Neil v. Biggers 409 U. S. 188 (1972) 
,0Manson v. Braithwaite 432 U. S. 98 (1977). 
"State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 774 (Utah, 1991). 
lo f tus , E. F. & Greene, E. (1980) Warning: Even memory for feces can be contagious. 
Law & Human Behavior. 4. 323 - 334. 
"Gorenstein, G. W. & Ellsworth, P. C. (1980) Effect of choosing an incorrect 
photograph on a later identification by an eyewitness. Journal of Applied Psychology. 65. 616-
witnesses stuck with that choice when the right choice was available & were thus much less likely 
to pick the correct choice. The Maestas case then presents the likelihood that a false 
identification made to a suggestive showup will continue to be made in a lineup. 
Finally, it should be noted that, in the general literature on suggestive influences on the 
eyewitness's memory, it is those memories that are weakest at the time of acquisition that are also 
those most vulnerable to suggestion. This is not a surprise. Consider the converse, namely a case 
where the perpetrator is well known to the witness or is well "learned" through interaction over a 
long period of time with full view of the face under adequate lighting, limited stress, etc. The 
witness is highly likely to resist a suggestion that it is someone else's face that belongs to the 
perpetrator. Clearly suggestion must operate on a weak memory, which is exactly the 
circumstance of this case. 
5. Retrieval. All of the previous is important to retrieval at an end point (such as a trial) 
since the process of remembering is a function of both the quality of information originally 
acquired by the witness and upon intervening time and events. If memory is poor or altered by 
intervening events, it will not improve for later retrieval. Indeed, when reports are limited and/or 
inconsistent, especially about central details of what happened, it is likely that some intervening 
process (forgetting, suggestion, or distortion) has occurred. Further, if there is an error in an 
earlier identification process, the resulting mistake win be believed by the witness and form the 
basis of subsequent incorrect retrieval. 
Finally, it is well established in the research that the relationship between the witness's 
confidence and the witness's correctness is extremely low when the acquisition conditions were 
poor14. These are the same acquisition conditions that lead a witness to be vulnerable to 
suggestion in the first place. But now the witness who is wrong comes to be highly convinced 
that this person, whose identity was "suggested" to them, is the right person. The research shows 
the witness who is highly confident is nearly as likely to be wrong as is the witness who is 
uncertain about whether he/she is correct if the conditions of the original acquisition minimize the 
opportunity for adequate acquisition. At least part of this effect seems to reflect a growing 
confidence over repeated interviews and testimony. Interestingly, there are research reports 
indicating that, as the eyewitness's confidence improves, the account of the event improves, and 
the confidence is explained by the witness also reporting improved lighting, longer time to 
observe, etc.15 
Sincerely 
David H. Dodd, Associate Professor of Psychology, Associate Dean 
622. 
14Wells & Murray (1984) Eyewitness confidence. In: Wells & Lofhis (Eds.), Eyewitness 
testimony: Psychological perspectives. 
15Cohen, as described and cited in Loftus & Doyle, op cit. 
ADDENDUM I 
STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE: This statement should contain your version of what happened 
related to the offense and should include your reasons for your involvement and how you feel about 
what happened. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
MAESTAS, GINO 
C. DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
"first of all I would like to say that the thought of Doing 
Something like this never crossed my mind till that night & 
would also like to NOTE: I had a job and I have alwas keep a 
job up till the time of my arrest & my version of what 
happen. I was out by my self and I came to the restaurant, 
and gas station I had a play gun so I thought I would get me 
some money to go get high I went to the gas station first 
and I then went to the restaurant I went in the restaurant 
and seen A young man at the counter. So I told him to give 
me the money and the rest of the people I told them to lay 
down, I took the money I knew none would get hurt as I said 
be for the gun was (not real) I left and about (10 or 15 
min) later I was in police custody 
The reason I did that was to go get high and have some extra 
money till I got paid that was the first time I have done 
that or anything rong. 
I am Very Sorey I put them people through that and sorey my 
family is going through this I regreet I have done this. I 
know that it was wrong no matter how I look at it I wish I 
could change it. if I could change it I would of asked for 
help to get off drugs now that I can get help I am going to 
do my best to get it. 
My life is going to change for the better I have a family to 
take care of And I have done that in the past in the right 
way. But now I made a Mistake but when I am released from 
prison I plan to never put anyone in that sitution again for 
I know that that does not get you no where in life and I 
should of Realized that Befor I chaned the lifefs of the 
victims and also the lifes of my family and also my life I 
regreet it more than anything I plan to change for all the 
Right Resons. 
(Thank you for your time and understanding)" 
Signed: Gino Maestas Dated: 07-10-95 
D. SOURCE OF INFORMATION; 
The defendant, Gino Maestas. 
E. CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: 
There are no co-defendants identified in this matter. 
it didn't even take into account the fact we were talking about 
firearm enhancements. Those weren't considered in the matrix. 
Even without that, the time indicated for the prison was 56 
years. The Court heard the evidence. These are serious 
matters. The statement made by Mr. Haestas that he did this 
because he wanted to have some money so he could do some drugs 
should — you know, offends the State a lot. For that reason, 
he then goes and puts people in peril, and puts them in a 
position where they think they are going to die. He does this 
with eight different people. 
Your Honor, I suggest that the Court view this very 
seriously. The question of whether or not to run these 
consecutive or concurrent, I think, is an important question. 
There is a lot of time the Court can assess on the firearm 
enhancements. That's a minimum of one year, to run 
consecutive, could be as much as five years. Because of the 
nature of these offenses, the fact that the number of them and 
all of the factors involved here, the prior record of this 
defendant, this isn't the first time he committed aggravated 
robbery, would suggest there is no question commitment should 
be involved, and it should be run consecutive. 
THE COURT: Anything the defendant would like to say 
before sentence is imposed? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I would like to state to the 
Court that the presentence report is unfair, like I know I had 
8 
admitted to the robberies that I done, I do have remorse for 
the victims, you know, and I regret doing what I did, but the 
56 years is kind of — isn't fair on my behalf. I can be a 
changed person. I was, like he said, I committed robbery 
before. I done time in prison. I got out, and I completed the 
programs and everything. I got caught up in drugs, which I 
have never had any offense for, and I got caught up in them, 
and I committed these robberies, and my intents wasn't to hurt 
anybody. I wasn't going to hurt anybody. In the trial, I was 
being nice about it, it is wrong what I did, but I wasn't 
threatening anybody, to kill anybody, or anything. My 
intention wasn't to hurt anybody. I would like some leniency 
from the Court on that. 56 years, that's my whole life, the 
rest of my life in prison. I can be changed. I have showed 
that before. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Do both sides submit? Is there any legal 
reason why sentence should not be imposed? 
MR. JOHNSTON: No. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: No. 
THE COURT: The defendant stands convicted of eight 
counts of first-degree felony. The gun enhancement provision 
still exists, does it not? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: It does. 
9 
